

Chapter 15

Social Identity in a Divided Cyprus

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The Cyprus issue is a complex problem of internal conflict between the two main communities of Cyprus, Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots, but also an issue of external interventions by various other countries with most prominent the continuing occupation by 30,000–40,000 Turkish troops of the northern part of Cyprus since 1974, the division of the island, and the existence of a secessionist state in Northern Cyprus. Both dimensions of the Cyprus issue implicate identity politics (Papadakis, 2003) into the collective struggles of the two communities, internal ideological tensions and differentiations within each community (Psaltis, 2012). It is thus of great importance to understand the social psychological dynamics of social identity relating to intergroup relations between the two communities and relations with the so-called motherlands, Turkey and Greece, at the symbolic level of identification. Such identity politics and symbolisms become relevant to the prospects of a solution in Cyprus as they are also deeply rooted in the history of the Cyprus issue itself.

The Cyprus Issue and its Relation to Identity Politics

Cyprus is often described as one of the longer frozen conflicts in Europe and given the role of Greek and Turkish nationalism in leading up to intercommunal strife (see Papadakis, 2003) between the two communities in 1957–58, 1963–1964 and 1974, the role played by ethnic and national identities has been described as crucial in both

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the formation and sustaining of division that came after the invasion/intervention by Turkey and the war that ensued.

The status quo on the island today is that of division of the country in two by a UN-patrolled buffer zone. The North (37 % of the island) is occupied by 30,000–40,000 Turkish troops who intervened/invaded Cyprus in 1974 after a short-lived coup engineered by the junta in Greece that aimed at union (*enosis*) of Cyprus with Greece. In 1983 the Turkish Cypriot leadership and Turkey declared an independent state that is recognised until today only by Turkey and condemned by the international community and UN resolutions. The rest of Cyprus is controlled by the internationally recognised Republic of Cyprus (RoC) and governed by Greek Cypriots. In 2003, travel restrictions between the two sides were lifted and contact between members of the two communities became possible. The whole of Cyprus joined the EU in 2004 but the *acquis communautaire* is suspended in the north pending a solution of the Cyprus problem. Negotiations are currently underway between negotiators and the two leaders of the two communities in order to reach a comprehensive settlement on the basis of a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation after a failed attempt in 2004. The dossiers under discussion concern (1) Governance and Power Sharing, (2) Property, (3) Territory, (4) Economic Affairs, (5) European Union Affairs and (6) Security and Guarantees.

Divided Collective Memory in Cyprus

The two communities in Cyprus have distinct ethnic, linguistic and religious backgrounds. Most Greek Cypriots are Greek-speaking, and Christian orthodox while most Turkish Cypriots speak Turkish and are Muslims albeit rather secular in orientation compared to mainland Turks. The fact that the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities have been divided geographically across ethnic lines for almost half a century resulted in two distinct collective memories of the past, especially regarding the Cyprus problem and its history. These divided collective memories of victimisation are closely aligned to the official historical narratives disseminated for years through the separate educational systems of the two communities (Psaltis, 2016).

In the case of Greek Cypriots, and given the official policy on the reunification of the RoC, and the withdrawal of Turkish occupying forces, the political narrative goes along the following lines “*We have always lived peacefully with Turkish Cypriots and we can do it again once the Turkish troops leave the country*” and “*the key to the solution is located in Ankara and not in the TC community*”. For Turkish Cypriots on the other hand, the political master narrative that promoted the ideal of two separate states in Cyprus is, more or less, like this: “*The experience of living with Greek Cypriots was one of domination and suppression and we will be better off having our own state*” and “*Turkey intervened in 1974 with a peace operation to save us from GCs*” (Lytras & Psaltis, 2011; Psaltis et al., 2014).

Such political discourses were championed for years by various political elites and the state administration for the corresponding “national collective struggles” in each community. The creation of different social representations of the Cyprus issue and its past contributed to the systematic use of rituals, national symbols (Psaltis,

Beydola, Filippou, & Vrachimis, 2014) memorials, commemorations, national struggle museums, and propaganda from the media and the educational system. The teaching of history in public schools systematically cultivated a specific mono-perspectival official narrative of victimisation by others, in both communities (Makriyianni, 2006; Makriyianni & Psaltis, 2007; Makriyianni, Psaltis, & Latif, 2011; Papadakis, 2005; Psaltis, 2012) that clearly ends up contributing to prejudice and distrust towards members of the other community when uncritically internalised by the individual (Psaltis, 2016).

Psychological Theories of Identity in Relation to the Master Narratives

Importantly, adherence to beliefs closely aligned with the official narratives relates to issues of ethnic and national identification (Psaltis, 2012). According to Papadakis (2008), the central nationalistic historical narrative in the Greek Cypriot (henceforth GC) textbooks is one that begins with the arrival of Greeks (fourteenth century BC) in Cyprus that led to the Hellenisation of Cyprus, where the moral centre is Greeks (of Cyprus) and the major enemy is Turks. The plot concerns a struggle for survival by Cypriot Hellenism against foreign conquerors and the end is tragic as it ends with the “Barbaric Turkish Invasion” and occupation of 37 % of Cyprus.

The corresponding Turkish Cypriot (henceforth TC) narrative is¹ one that begins with the arrival of Turks in Cyprus (in 1571 AD), the moral self is Turks (of Cyprus) and the major enemy are “Rums”.² The plot concerns a struggle for survival by the Turks of Cyprus against Greek Cypriot domination. The war of 1974 marks a happy ending with the “Happy peace operation” by Turkey in Cyprus.

Such adherence to the official narratives is directly related to peace and conflict in Cyprus due to the fact that representations of the past structure present intergroup relations and constrain or canalise the present–future transition towards specific ideal solutions of the problem (Psaltis, 2012, 2016). In Cyprus, as in other parts of the world, it was found that such beliefs are not only predictive of threats, of both realistic and symbolic form (Stephan, Ybarra, & Morrison, 2009); but through these threats, prejudice is increased and further distrust is created between the two communities, which is eventually reflected in reduced will to coexist with the other community and reduced support for the UN sponsored proposed solution of Federation.

¹In 2004, new history books for the history of Cyprus were written by the new elected leadership of Mehmet Ali Talat offered an alternative narrative that challenged the separatist and nationalistic narrative that was in place up to that point (see Papadakis (2008) for an analysis of these short-lived books). However, in 2010 with the election of a new nationalist administration these textbooks were replaced by new ones that reverted to the old nationalist narrative described in the text above (see Makriyianni et al., 2011).

²Turkish word for Greek Cypriot, it is also a word used for Christian Orthodox Turkish citizens today in Turkey and Orthodox Christian subjects during the Ottoman era in Turkey.

It could therefore be argued that such representations aligned with the master narratives furnish positions of a “proud” but threatened and exclusionary “identity” in the representational field. This “proud and threatened identity” in turn is predictive of both distrust and prejudice towards the other community. The social identities implicated in the ideological struggles around the Cyprus issue cannot be readily mapped on the original formulation of SIT of an in-group and an out-group as they engage “motherland” countries, both on premises of cultural similarity with the mainland ethnic group, and also on more pragmatic grounds as a stronger ally that supports the collective struggle of the in-group towards the primary out-group. Such a complex situation makes competing forms of identification within each community germane. Similar forms of identification can be found in other ethnically heterogeneous nations with secessionist movements, like the United Kingdom, Spain, Canada and China, who experience social tension between ethnic group attachment (ethno-territorial or regional or subgroup identity) and national attachment (state identity; Moreno, 2006; Sidanius, Feshbasch, Levin, & Pratto, 1997). In such contexts, dual identities or compound nationality become relevant. This is because individuals could identify themselves in sub-state minority nations or regions. In such cases, stronger ethno-territorial or regional identity often leads to higher demands for political autonomy and self-government between sub-state communities (Moreno, 2006).

The methodological ramifications of the need to capture the position of an individual between these two competing forms of identification were discussed by Moreno (2006) who introduced a scale (the so-called Moreno question) aiming at capturing the tension between sub-state claims for autonomy and a superordinate category of a central state or authority. For example in the case of Scotland-UK, the question consisted of a five-category scale concerning dual self-identification by the Scots on how they see themselves in terms of their nationality: (1) Scottish, not British, (2) More Scottish than British, (3) Equally Scottish and British, (4) More British than Scottish, or (5) British, not Scottish. This type of scale could be modified in different surveys for different populations (e.g. Spain—Catalonian or Spanish), concerning national self-identification and identity attachment to both state and sub-state levels (Moreno, 2006). Respondents thus have to balance the relative weight of two identities, usually a sub-state level and state level.

In segregated Cyprus, there are thus various forms of identification that become relevant to identity politics and ideological contestation. At the subgroup or communal level, one can identify as Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot. Given the secession claims of the Turkish occupied north, and the history of the claims for union with Greece by Greek Cypriots, testing the strength of ethnic identification or a “motherland” identification (being Greek or Turkish) in relation to the strength of identification of a superordinate national identity (identification as being Cypriot) is also very important and could be captured by the Moreno question. This is a scale that was adapted in the past for use in the Cypriot context (Peristianis, 2006; Psaltis, 2012), and it proved useful since it was indeed related to the quality of intergroup relations in Cyprus.

In the Greek Cypriot community, there is an ideological contest concerning the national identity of the Greek Cypriots. National identity is shaped according to two

ideologies: Hellenocentrism, giving emphasis to the Greek identity of Cypriots; and Cypriot-centrism, often related to left-wing political orientations, giving emphasis to the Cypriot identity (Peristianis, 2006) which is a form of resistance to Hellenocentrism but also a proposal for the construction of a Cypriot identity (either in its civic form that encompasses both communities irrespective of ethnic origin, or an identity premised on cultural similarity between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots).

Identification as Greek in the context of Hellenocentrism as an ideological position is often an expression of conservative, right wing and nationalistic views, accompanied with adherence to a system of beliefs stressing the attachment of Greek Cypriots to Greece as the “motherland”, also tending to agree with statements like “I am characterised by the Greek cultural origin”, “Cyprus is historically a Greek place” and “Christianity is an indispensable part of our identity”; which form part of an identity position historically traced as abiding to the “Hellenochristian ideals” and a continuity of Greek nationalism in Cyprus.

The corresponding pattern occurs in the Turkish Cypriot community, with those attached to Turkey as their motherland and protector (Turko-centrism) also tending to agree with statements like “I am characterised by the Turkish cultural origin”, “Cyprus is historically a Turkish place” and “Islam is an indispensable part of our identity”. There are also those Turkish Cypriots who adopt a Cypriot-centric ideology that is again a form of resistance to the Turko-centric ideology giving emphasis to local traditions of Turkish Cypriots, attachment to the land of Cyprus and its people and similarities with Greek Cypriots (Vural & Rustemli, 2006).

Given this complexity, it is only natural that discussions about a possible solution to the Cyprus issue and the creation of a Federal Reunited Cyprus that entails the end of Turkish occupation, withdrawal of Greek troops in Cyprus and amendment of the Security Guarantees by Turkey, Greece and Britain often get entangled with the aforementioned issues of identification. (See Fig. 15.1 for a graphic depiction of current complexity of identifications and possible transition in case of a solution).

Another important dimension of the Cyprus issue entangled in the identity politics discussed above is the existence of a large number of individuals of Turkish origin who moved in Cyprus after 1974. These individuals are generally referred as “settlers” by Greek Cypriots and by Turkish Cypriots as “immigrants” (see Loizides, 2011). Most




Fig. 15.1 The complexity of identity in a divided Cyprus and the transition to a Reunited Federal Cyprus

people outside Cyprus are well aware of the Greek Cypriots' hostile feelings and attitudes towards Turkey as the invading enemy force. These "settlers/immigrants" therefore are seen as a threat to the demographic nature of Cyprus and thus are considered as one of the by-products of Turkish war crimes committed by Turkey against Cyprus. However, not many people are aware of the less known, but not less complex, conflict between Turkish Cypriots and Turkish Settlers/ Immigrants who first arrived following the Turkish invasion/intervention under decrees and the protection of Turkish State and army to fill the vacuum when the coup and the invasion/intervention resulted in the displacement and ethnic homogenisation of Greek Cypriots in the Republic of Cyprus controlled areas and Turkish Cypriots in the Turkish controlled areas. Research on this "lesser known schism of Cyprus" (Christiansen, 2005: p. 156) is rather scarce, but it reveals that the intergroup relations between the Turkish Settlers/immigrants and Turkish Cypriots is problematic and complex at its best and started to turn from sweet to sour some time ago (Navaro-Yashin, 2006). In the following section, we elaborate on the nature of these "souring" intergroup relations between Turkish Cypriots and Turkish Immigrants/Settlers drawing from existing research and our own research as they relate to issues of social identity.

Paramount to the complexity of the issue is the increasing Turkish presence in the Turkish-controlled areas. Under heavy political and social influence from Turkey and despite its illegal circumstances, the Turkish presence in the north has grown without any international interference effectively triggering a complex range of social psychological processes (Cakal, 2012). While the Turkish influx created an opportunity for interaction between Turks from the "motherland" and Turkish Cypriots, it also created a range of complex intergroup problems. The ever increasing numbers of Turks engulfing the Turkish Cypriots created a multidimensional conflict, e.g. social, political and economic, between Turkish Cypriots and the Turkish Immigrants adding yet another dimension to the Cyprus issue. Turkish Cypriots perceive the settlers as threats to their economic, political and social values and settlers remain under-represented in the political arena, and have access to lower economic and social resources (Hatay, 2005). Although comparative studies examining these processes in a tripartite fashion using data from Greek Cypriots, Turkish Cypriots and Turkish Settlers are scant, preliminary findings imply that intergroup relations between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots and the related identities are heavily influenced by the existence of the Turkish Settlers and the related social psychological processes, including intergroup contact with and attitudes towards settlers especially among the Turkish Cypriots. Research conducted has shown that frequent positive contact with Turkish settlers is associated with increased perception of threats from Greek Cypriots and negative evaluations of Greek Cypriots among Turkish Cypriots. In similar vein, more contact with Greek Cypriots is associated with less trust in Turkish Settlers and negative evaluations of them (Cakal, 2012).

In relation to these observations, it should be noted that the vast majority of peace and reconciliation initiatives that have been taking place in Cyprus are of a bi-communal nature and rarely, if ever, include any settlers/immigrants from Turkey despite the fact that mainland Turks currently probably outnumber population figures of native Turkish Cypriots in the North of Cyprus (Sapienza, 2014). Such initiatives from 1974 to 2003,

given the absence of free movement between the two communities, took the form of conflict resolution workshops led by academics and conflict resolution trainers outside Cyprus or in the UN Buffer Zone under special permission from the UN (see Broome, 1998). However, after 2003 and the opening of the checkpoints, more bottom-up and locally rooted initiatives, of an emerging pro-reconciliation civil society made their appearance and are aiming at contact between members of the two communities covering areas relating to education (even history teaching), business, human rights, women's issues and sports (See Loizos, 2006; Psaltis et al., 2014).

In the following section, we first explore the complex dimensions of social identity among Turkish Cypriots. We then discuss how these dimensions interact with the social, economic and political phenomena to influence the intergroup relations between Turkish Cypriots and Turks.

Intergroup Relations and Social Identities in Cyprus: Empirical Evidence

Earlier, Tajfel (1982) emphasised the relational nature of social identity by proposing that individuals seek to achieve a positive social identity by comparing the in-group with the socially relevant out-group (See Hogg, 2016 for more detail). Most research on intergroup conflict and social identity has focused on binary intergroup relations so far (but see Glasford & Calcagno, 2012) and ignored the intergroup relations in complex societies in which multiple groups coexist. One of the aims of the present research is to bridge this gap by focusing on the intergroup relations beyond binary distinctions.

In a survey of a representative sample from both communities conducted in 2007 (Psaltis, 2012) only 9.3 %, of the overall respondents in the Turkish Cypriot community identified themselves as Cypriots as opposed to 66.1 % who identified themselves as Turkish Cypriots (*Kibrislitrk*). At the other extreme end, however, a notable number of Turkish Cypriots (17.7 %) identified themselves as Turk. It should be noted that about 20–25 % of the electoral list in the TC community in 2005 was comprised by mainland Turks (Hatay, 2005). This is also reflected in the fact that almost 90 % of the participants identifying themselves as Turk do hold a Turkish citizenship from Turkey.

While it is difficult to speculate how many of these respondents are settlers, immigrants or individuals who were born in Cyprus to parents from either groups, recent evidence on the intergroup relations between Turkish Cypriots and Turks from mainland Turkey suggests that there is a clearer separation of the two communities, especially in the last decade (Cakal, 2012). In a similar vein, there has been a recent shift towards a more Cypriot-centric Turkish Cypriotness among the Turkish Cypriots. For example, in a recent survey in both communities, using the Social Cohesion and reconciliation Index (SCORE, 2014), it was found that in a representative sample of the Turkish Cypriot community of native Turkish Cypriots that were given the opportunity to choose between Cypriot, Turkish Cypriot, Turkish and European as

identification, for the first time in the last decade there were more participants identifying as Cypriot (43 %) compared to Turkish Cypriot (41 %) which indicates that Cyprio-centric views might be on the rise, in the Turkish Cypriot community. Indeed, in the most recent election, Mustafa Akinci who was elected as the Turkish Cypriot leader campaigned on a Cypriot-centric platform and he is well known for his criticism of Turkocentric views.

As we argued at the start of this chapter, it is possible to speak about several layers of social identity among both Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots, e.g. supranational, national, religious and ethnic layers (see Fig. 15.1). Therefore, untangling this complex web of identities is a challenging task. Social identity theory observes that individuals identify with a group on the basis of two fundamental motives: (a) subjective uncertainty reduction and (b) enhancement of self-esteem (Abrams & Hogg, 1988; Hornsey & Hogg, 2000; Martiny & Rubin, 2016). Even before individuals form such motives, of course they are ontogenetically first positioned from early childhood by their social milieu as ethnic subjects. While identifying with a particular group reduces the uncertainty about one's identity, how one and others should behave on the basis of this identity, and being able to differentiate that group from the other group could also positively boost self-esteem. Results from a recent correlational investigation of different layers of social identity among Turkish Cypriots suggest intergroup relations, especially social ties and contact with the relevant out-group(s), is an important factor influencing these motives. Yetkili (2007) investigated how central Turkish Cypriot, Turkish, Cypriot, Muslim and European are to their self concept and social identity and how strongly they identify with these groups, among Turkish Cypriots ($N=217$). He found that individuals perceive being Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot as being equally most central to their self-concept and being Turkish and Muslim are least central to their self-concept. Comparing the strength of different social identities revealed that people identify highly as Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot, while identification is significantly lower for Turkish and Muslim. More recent findings from representative samples of two communities (Psaltis & Lytras, 2012) reveal that in both communities the strength and importance of identification with both the superordinate and the subgroup identity is indeed very high: For GCs, mean level of strength of identification as Cypriot was on a 5-point Likert scale ($M=4.26$, $SD=0.62$) and identification as Greek Cypriot was ($M=4.07$, $SD=0.74$) while for TCs (native only) identification as Cypriots was ($M=3.98$, $SD=0.77$) and identification as Turkish Cypriot was ($M=4.01$, $SD=0.79$). It is worth noting that in this research when participants were asked to choose between the various forms of identification the one that best describes themselves, only a very small percentage in both communities chose to identify with "motherland" ethnic identity: Only 1.2 % identified as a "Greek" for Greek Cypriots and 9.2 % as "Turk" for TCs (in a sample consisting of mainland Turks and native TCs) which supports the view that "motherland" ideologies are becoming marginalised in Cyprus in both communities.

In the same research, the Moreno question was asked in both communities. In the Greek Cypriot community, the results were as follows: Only Greek and not Cypriot (0.8 %), Greek and a bit Cypriot (5.2 %) to the same extend Greek and Cypriot (57.9 %), Cypriot and a bit Greek (16.2 %) and Only Cypriot and not Greek (19.9 %).

Table 15.1 Identification and the Moreno question in the Greek Cypriot community

	Only Greek and not Cypriot	Greek and a bit Cypriot	To the same extent Greek and Cypriot	Cypriot and a bit Greek	Only Cypriot and not Greek	
Cypriot (%)	0	4.3	60.9	31.5	3.3	100.0
Greek Cypriot (Ελληνοκύπριος/α) (%)	0	5.7	77.6	15.1	1.6	100.0
Greek of Cyprus (%)	0	30.8	55.8	9.6	3.8	100.0
Greek (%)	23.1	38.5	30.8	0	7.7	100.0
Moreno question answers total (%)	0.4	5.8	48.5	28.7	16.6	100.0

In the Turkish Cypriot community, the results were as follows: Only Turkish and not Cypriot (7.6 %), Turkish and a bit Cypriot (7.3 %) to the same extent Turkish and Cypriot (61.8 %), Cypriot and a bit Turkish (12.4 %) and Only Cypriot and not Turkish (10.9 %). It should be noted once the answers of native TCs only are taken into account, then the percentage of participants identifying as “Only Turkish and not Cypriot” drops to 2.6 % while positions giving more weight to the Cypriot than the Turkish element become more similar to the situation in the GC community (about 1/3 of the sample).

Cross-tabulating the answers to the Moreno question with identification questions proves to be a very interesting exercise as it reveals the multiplicity of meanings behind categorisations and identifications. For example, in an earlier research with data collected in March 2007 with a large-scale questionnaire survey using a representative sample from both Turkish Cypriots ($N=853$) and Greek Cypriots ($N=800$) between the ages of 18 and 65 (see Psaltis, 2012) such a variability of meaning was clearly visible in both communities.

The results reported in Table 15.1 suggest that with the exception of the GCs who identify as Greeks who give more importance to being Greek than Cypriot, the rest of the categorisations underneath reveal giving equal importance to the Cypriot and Greek elements in their social identity. The picture is similar in the Turkish Cypriot community (see Table 15.2) since, with the exception of the TCs who identify as Turks who give more importance to being Turkish than Cypriot, the rest of the categorisations underneath reveal giving equal importance to the Cypriot and Turkish elements in their social identity.

Comparing the subgroups of our sample who identify with these different categories, as expected it is revealed that in both communities participants identifying as Cypriot exhibit significantly lower levels of threat, prejudice and distrust for members of the other community compared to participants who identify as Greek/Turks of Cyprus or simply Greeks or Turks correspondingly in the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot community.

Table 15.2 Identification and the Moreno question in the Turkish Cypriot community

	Only Turkish and not Cypriot	Turkish and a bit Cypriot	To the same extent Turkish and Cypriot	Cypriot and a bit/Turkish	Only Cypriot and not Turkish	
Cypriot (%)	1.4	2.7	45.9	32.4	17.6	100.0
Turkish-Cypriot (<i>Kibrislitürk</i>) (%)	0.9	3.3	84.2	10.6	0.9	100.0
Cypriot Turk (%)	0	10.0	80.0	10.0	0	100.0
Turk of Cyprus (%)	7.7	23.1	53.8	7.7	7.7	100.0
Turk (%)	67.1	5.4	24.8	2.0	0.7	100.0
Moreno question answers total (%)	13.1	4.3	69.2	10.9	2.5	100.0

It is worth noting that on the whole, GCs seem more willing to embrace the superordinate identity and distance themselves from “motherland” and we believe this is in line with one of the classic predictions of the common in-group identity model which suggests that the majority group members are more motivated to support a “single group” representation. In the long run, however, such an emphasis on a single group representation might have unintended consequences for social change, especially among the minority group members. That said, it is also relevant to explore the content of identification with Cypriot identity because for some GCs, Cypriot=Greek Cypriot in their everyday discussions and understanding, which is functioning as an exclusive form of identification as the subgroup could be projected to the superordinate (*Pars Pro Toto*, Wenzel, Mummendey, Weber, & Waldzus, 2003). Correlational analyses of the *strength of identification* with superordinate identity and various measures of intergroup relations often show “feeling proud of being Cypriot” is essentially taken to be synonymous with “feeling proud of being a Greek Cypriot”. From this perspective, it should be no surprise that in some studies strength of identification with being “Cypriot” is related to higher levels of prejudice, threats and distrust. This was documented also in a research with 11-year-old GC children (Makriyianni, 2006).

These two dominant forms of identification in both communities (the subgroup and superordinate identification) are not seen as mutually exclusive by the majority of participants. In fact, the correlations between the *strength of identification* for the two communities, as research often shows, varies from 0.40 to 0.50 which is an indication that many individuals might be actually projecting the in-group to the superordinate category (Wenzel et al., 2003) which is to one extent expected given the geographical separation of the two communities for so many years that leads to a socialisation into a Cypriot identity that is mostly exclusive of the other community.

Although these findings reveal the complex structure of social identity among the Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots and their dominant forms of identification, they are unable to show how these identities interact with out-group attitudes or other social psychological processes, e.g. intergroup attitudes, positive or negative intergroup affect or collective action. We discuss these issues below.

In the Turkish Cypriot community, despite the opportunities for contact created by the influx of settlers in the north, the two communities remain largely segregated. Findings from recent research conducted among the Turkish Cypriots reveal that even if they exist, neighbourhood and workplace opportunities for contact are seldom utilised. Looking at three dimensions of contact, i.e. general, neighbourhood, school/workplace contact, Turkish Cypriots reported to have no or very little contact (Combined Mean = 1.56, $SD=0.97$; measured by 5-point Likert scales; Cakal, 2012). Given such a lack of contact, perhaps it is not surprising to see that Turkish Cypriots generally evaluate the Turks negatively, report a lack of trust towards Turks, and think that the economic, social, and political differences between Turkish Cypriots and Turks in favour of the former group is legitimate (Out-group evaluation $M=2.20$, $SD=1.05$; Out-group Trust $M=1.09$, $SD=1.13$; Legitimacy $M=3.97$, $SD=1.13$, measured by 5-point Likert scales; Cakal, 2012).

In a similar vein, this lack of contact is also reflected in perceptions of threat posed by Turkish immigrants/settlers. Among the Turkish Cypriots, Turkish immigrants/settlers are regarded as a source of threat to the social and economic resources that the Turkish Cypriot in-group controls. Findings from the same study ($N=437$) suggest that over 85 % of those who took part reported high level of perceived symbolic and realistic threat from mainland Turks living in Cyprus (Combined Mean = 4.11, $SD=1.12$; Both types of threats are measured by 5-point Likert scale; Cakal, 2012). The levels of threat by individuals of Turkish origin were actually higher compared to the levels of threat felt by GCs who were traditionally seen as the primary out-group in the conflict. In addition, the majority of the participants reported that their group esteem as Turkish Cypriots is undermined by Turkish Settlers ($M=4.22$, $SD=0.90$).

Using the same data from Cakal (2012), we conducted additional analyses to explore how strength of identification as Turkish Cypriot interacts with attitudes towards the two most relevant out-groups, i.e. Turkish Settlers/Immigrants and Greek Cypriots. Our findings revealed that stronger identification with the Turkish Cypriot in-group is associated with negative evaluations of Greek Cypriots via perceived threats. More specifically, stronger identification as Turkish Cypriot was associated with higher perceived threats which in turn were associated with more negative evaluations of Greek Cypriots. To explore the multidimensional aspect of intergroup relations, we then tested the effect of social identity as Turkish Cypriot on out-group evaluations for Turkish Settlers via symbolic and realistic threats from Greek Cypriots. We found that social identity as Turkish Cypriot was associated with more positive evaluations of Turkish Settlers via perceived realistic threats from Greek Cypriots. More individuals identified as Turkish Cypriots and more perceived realistic threats from Greek Cypriots which in turn were associated with more positive evaluations of Turkish Settlers.

A similar set of analyses revealed that social identity as Turkish Cypriot was associated with less positive evaluations of Turkish Settlers via perceived realistic threat. Looking at cross-group effects, we found a similar effect of social identity on out-group evaluations of Greek Cypriots via perceived threats from Turkish Settlers.

Taken together, these results reveal how complex intergroup relations are in multi-ethnic societies. In particular, the impact of social identity on out-group evaluations of a particular group seems to be influenced by the perceived threats, i.e. realistic threats, by a third group. In the case of the Turkish Cypriot community, this finding resonates well with the official historical narrative promoted for years by separatist-nationalists that Turkey intervened in Cyprus to protect Turkish Cypriots from Greek Cypriots. From this perspective, the feelings of Turkish Cypriots towards Turks take an instrumental nature since the less they feel threatened by Greek Cypriots, the less they would feel the need of attachment to Turks and Turkey for protection.

Given the close relationship between the strength of identification between the subgroup and the superordinate identity discussed earlier, it would be interesting to also explore whether the strength of various kinds of identification discussed earlier retain a similar pattern of correlations with threats as mediators of the identification-prejudice or distrust relationship. It is also interesting to explore whether the well-known distinction in the Cypriot context between a Helleno/Turko centric and Cypriot-centric ideology is more relevant to intergroup relations than the classical SIT approach to *strength of identification* given the complexity of relations with third countries like Greece and Turkey. A conceptual model therefore to explore these connections would be the one presented in Fig. 15.2. In this model, all independent variables should be considered interrelated.




Fig. 15.2 A conceptual model of social identities in Cyprus and intergroup relations

Discussion of Empirical Findings and Future Directions for Research

The available data from our own research support a pattern of correlations in both communities, seen in Fig. 15.2. Beyond being related to each other, strength of identification with both superordinate and subgroup identification predicted more negative intergroup relations with the other community. One might expect that strength of identification with the superordinate would have a more unifying function but the geographical division and the low levels of contact between members of the two communities suggests that Cypriot identity is still not an identity that symbolically encompasses both Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots for most of the participants in our research. In fact, one of the main challenges for the viability of a reunited federal Cyprus is the promotion of an inclusive form of civic identity or constitutional patriotism as Cypriots irrespective of the ethnic origin of the inhabitants of Cyprus.

Implications for the Local Context and Peacemaking Efforts

These results have important implications for current attempts at the intercommunal level as they directly inform current negotiations on the reunification of the island. The form of Cypriot identity, that carries a symbolical weight pro-unification of Cyprus, is the one that appears as a form of resistance to Helleno-centric and Turko-centric views which encompasses a clear vision of a civic identity and allegiance to a possible joined future under a Federal state. This is supported by the fact that identities that symbolically prioritise Greece and Turkey (in the Moreno question or measurement of Helleno/Turko Centrism) over Cyprus bare stronger relationships with threats, thus leading to reduced trust and more prejudice towards the other community. In particular, reduced allegiance to a civic Cypriot identity and more attachment to “motherlands” leads to a worsening of relations with members from the other community. Adherence to views like “Cyprus is Greek” or “Greece is the motherland” in case of Greek Cypriots or “Cyprus is Turkish” or “Turkey is the motherland” for Turkish Cypriots are clearly empirically related to exclusionary identities and a sense of threat coming from the other community of Cyprus. Unfortunately, such views are difficult to change as they are until today supported by collective memory, master narratives, rituals and “national” celebrations (see Psaltis, 2016) which become highly problematic for the efforts to reunify Cyprus.

Implications for Future Research

As for future research, the issues we discussed in this chapter imply that research on social identity and intergroup contact should move beyond the classic binary approach to identity and intergroup conflict. Multiethnic societies such as Cyprus, India or

South American countries (see González, Gerber, & Carvacho, 2016) where ethnic and religious groups are an integral part of the mainstream society present a challenging context to the social identity theory and intergroup contact theory. In such contexts, it is important to situate identities in the social representational field of social conflicts and identify a variety of identity positions that could be forms of resistance to various and heterogeneous systems of meaning (see Psaltis, 2012).

Given that intergroup relations between two given groups have an immediate effect on the intergroup relations that one of these groups has with a third group, a phenomena known as “secondary transfer effects of contact” (Tausch et al., 2010), it is expected that such transferable effects will not be limited to positive ones only and that there is the need to explore “Negative Secondary Contact Effects” also. Current research on the transferable effects of intergroup contact suggests that positive effects of intergroup contact extends beyond members of those groups who have frequent contact with each other to members of third or fourth groups who do not have contact with any of the immediate groups. Our results suggest that negative or paradoxical effects of contact too are transferable. Given the recent surge of interest in negative intergroup contact (Paolini, Harwood, & Rubin, 2010), it would be interesting how extendible are the negative effects of contact between two groups on a third group.

Another possible and equally interesting avenue for future research would be to explore how a common in-group identity could influence social change. The majority of the existing research suggests that a common in-group identity could have negative effects on social change among the minorities and disadvantaged groups. Emerging research conducted in non-WEIRD (Western Educated Industrialized Rich Democratic) countries, however, (Henrich, Heine, & Norenzayan, 2010) suggests together with intergroup contact common in-group identity can motivate members of different groups to engage in collective action for the mutual benefit of both groups (Cakal, Eller, Sirlopú, & Perez, [in press](#); Cakal, Hewstone, & Eller, [under review](#); Glasford & Calcagno, 2012). Future research can also investigate how sub and common in-group identities would interact towards a mutual collective action especially in post-conflict societies where previously rival groups could engage in collective action against a common out-group.

Conclusion

We started this chapter by discussing the complexities of social identity in culturally and ethnically diverse societies in the Cypriot context. We then discussed the necessity of moving beyond the conventional “binary” approach to intergroup relations in complex societies such as Cyprus and illustrated the necessity of such a move with findings from existing and our own research. In particular, we showed that classic theorising on social identity and related processes, while useful in less-complex societies, do not readily map unto the social identity processes in complex multiethnic societal structures or divided communities. Thus, to echo Henrich et al. (2010), if we are to move beyond non-WEIRD societies, we need novel conceptual tools to adequately address the complexities presented by such societal structures.

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