The Equilibrium Dynamics of Liquidity and Illiquid Asset Prices*

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Abstract

When purchasing a security an investor needs not only have in mind the cash flows that the security will pay into the indefinite future, he/she must also anticipate his/her desire and ability to resell the security in the marketplace at a later point in time. In this paper, we show that the endogenous stochastic process of the liquidity of securities is as important to investment and valuation as is the stochastic process of their future cash flows.

We, therefore, develop a general equilibrium model with heterogeneous agents that have an everyday motive to trade.

Our method delivers the optimal, market-clearing moves of each investor and the resulting ticker and transactions prices in the presence of transaction costs. We use it to show the effect of transactions costs on asset prices, on deviations from the classic consumption CAPM and on the time path of transactions prices and trades, including their total and quadratic variations. We also show that transactions costs can explain some of the empirical asset-pricing anomalies.

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When purchasing a security an investor needs not only have in mind the cash flows that the security will pay into the indefinite future, he/she must also anticipate his/her desire and ability to resell the security in the marketplace at a later point in time. In this paper, we show that the endogenous stochastic process of the liquidity of securities is as important to investment and valuation as is the stochastic process of their future cash flows.

At any given time, an asset is more or less liquid as a function of three conceivable mechanisms and their fluctuating impact, taken in isolation or combined. The first mechanism is the fear of default of the counterparty to the trade. Trade is obviously hampered by the fear that contracts will not be abided by. The second mechanism is informed trading (asymmetric information) as in the market for “lemons” (Akerlof (1970)). Bhattacharya and Spiegel (1998) have shown the way in which the lemon problem can cause markets to close down. The third mechanism, which we examine here, is the presence of physical transactions costs.\(^1\)

Access to a financial market is a service that investors make available to each other. The production of this service is achieved by means of a transactions technology that requires some physical input and is, therefore, available at a cost. The physical costs incurred in operating a market are as central to our understanding of financial-market equilibrium as is the production function or the cost function to our understanding of the equilibrium in the market for other goods and services. Given the presence of that cost, an investor may decide not to trade, thereby preventing other investors from trading with him/her, which is an additional endogenous, stochastic and perhaps quantitatively more important consequence of the cost. As a way of providing a simple model, we assume that the trading of a security or the processing of an order entails a physical deadweight cost that is proportional to the number of shares traded and that is paid by both the buyer and the seller.

In the real world, investors do not trade with each other. They trade through intermediaries called brokers, who incur physical costs and charge a cost that is close to being proportional to the value of the shares traded, not to the number of shares traded. This service charge aims to cover the actual physical cost of trading plus a profit. This paper is not about the pricing policy of brokers. We bypass brokers and let the investors incur the physical cost directly.

To our knowledge, the functional form of the physical cost has not been documented very well. A cost proportional to the number of shares seems like a reasonable starting point, although it is clear that there must also exist sizable fixed costs, which we do not consider here.\(^2\)

Our goal is to study, in terms both of price and volume, the dynamics of a financial-market equilibrium which we can expect to observe when there are frictions and when investors have an every-day motive for trading, such as shocks

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\(^1\)On the various possible determinants of liquidity, see the synthesis paper of Vayanos and Wang (2009).

\(^2\)The equilibrium with other, less obvious costs, such as holding costs and participation costs, has been investigated by Tuckman and Vila (2010), Huang and Wang (2010) and Peress (2005).
to their endowments, that is separate from the long-term need to trade for lifetime planning purposes. Actually, we assume long-lived investors who trade because they have differing risk aversions while they have access only to a menu of linear assets, which, without transactions costs, would be sufficient to make the market dynamically complete. Dynamic completeness is, of course, killed by the presence of transactions costs. The imbalance of the portfolios investors have to hold because of transactions costs act as an inventory cost.

Our paper is related to the existing studies of portfolio choice under transactions costs such as Constantinides (1976a, 1976b, 1986), Davis and Norman (1990), Dumas and Luciano (1991), Edirisinghe, Naik and Uppal (1993), Gennotte and Jung (1994), Shreve and Soner (1994), Leland (2000), Nazareth (2002), Bouchard (2002), Obizhaeva and Wang (2005), Liu and Lowenstein (2002) and Jang, Koo, Liu and Lowenstein (2007) among others. As was noted by Dumas and Luciano, these papers suffer from a logical quasi-inconsistency. Not only do they assume an exogenous process for securities returns, as do all portfolio optimization papers, but they do so in a way that is incompatible with the portfolio policy that is produced by the optimization. The portfolio strategy is of a type that recognizes the existence of a “no-trade” region. Yet, it is assumed that prices continue to be quoted and trades remain available in the marketplace. Obviously, the assumption must be made that some traders, other than the one whose portfolio is being optimized, do not incur costs. In the present paper, we assume that all investors face the cost of trading.

The inventory of securities held by each investor can be viewed as a state variable in the dynamics of our equilibrium, a feature that is shared with the inventory-management model of a broker that has been pioneered by Ho and Stoll (1980, 1983), which is one of the main pillars of the Microstructure literature. In their work, however, Ho and Stoll take the arrival of orders to the broker as an exogenous process.

3 Constantinides (1986) in his pioneering paper on portfolio choice under transactions costs attempted to draw some conclusions concerning equilibrium. Assuming that returns were independently, identically distributed (IID) over time, he claimed that the expected return required by an investor to hold a security was affected very little by transactions costs. Liu and Lowenstein (2002), Jang, Koo, Liu and Lowenstein (2007) and Dumas an Puopolo (2010) have shown that this is generally not true under non IID returns. The possibility of falling in a “no-trade” region is obviously a massive violation of the IID assumption.

4 Recently, Rosu (2009) has developed a model in the same vein in which, however, the brokers interact with each other in a non competitive way.

5 Another predecessor is Milne and Neave (2003), which, however, contains few quantitative results.
we introduce a higher-frequency motive to trade. In the paper of Lo, Mamaysky and Wang (2004), costs of trading are fixed costs, all traders have the same negative exponential utility function, individual investors’ endowments provide the motive to trade (as in our paper) but aggregate endowment is not stochastic. In our current paper, costs are proportional, utility is a power utility that differs across traders and endowments are free to follow an arbitrary stochastic process. To our knowledge, ours is the first paper to reach that goal.

One can capture liquidity considerations by means of an explicit cost, as we do here, or by a constraint. Holmström and Tirole (2001) study a financial-market equilibrium in which investors face an exogenous constraint on borrowing. When they hit their constraint, investors are said to be “liquidity constrained”. Gromb and Vayanos (2002) and Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2008) study situations in which the amount of arbitrage capital is constrained. It would be necessary to present some microfoundations for the constraint. A constraint on borrowing would best be justified by the risk of default on the loan. Equilibrium with default is an important but separate topic of research.

As far as the solution method is concerned, our analysis is closely related, in ways we explain below, to “the dual method” used by Jouini and Kallal (1995), Cvitanic and Karatzas (1996), Kallsen and Muhle-Karbe (2008) and Deelstra, Pham and Touzi (2002) among others.

In computing an equilibrium, one has a choice between a “recursive” method, which solves by backward induction over time, and a “global” method, which solves for all optimality conditions and market-clearing conditions of all states of nature and points in time simultaneously. The global method, often implemented in the form of a homotopy, is limited in terms of the number of periods it can handle. Here, we resort to a recursive technique, which requires the choice of state variables – both exogenous and endogenous – that track the state of the economy. Dumas and Lysaﬂ (2010) have proposed an efficient method to calculate incomplete-market equilibria recursively with a dual approach, which utilizes state prices as endogenous state variables. We use the same method here. A crucial advantage of using dual variables as state variables to handle proportional-transactions costs problems is that the additional state variables thus introduced evolve on a fixed domain, namely the interval set by the per share cost of buying and the cost of selling (with opposite signs), whereas primal variables, such as portfolio choices evolve over a domain that has free-floating barriers, to be determined. The dual problem, for that reason, is more convenient.

Empirical work on equilibria with transactions costs has been couched in

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6As is apparent below, the cost and the constraint approaches are somewhat similar but are probably not equivalent to each other. As we show, transaction costs give rise to shadow prices of potentially being unable to trade that are specific to each asset and each investor, whereas a constraint gives rise to a dual variable that is specific to each investor only.

7Distant antecedents of this idea in the macroeconomic literature can be found in the form of Clower and Bushaw (1954) constraints, which required a household to hold some money balance, as opposed to being able to borrow, when it wanted to consume, as well as the “cash-in-advance” model of Lucas (1982).

8A global solution is offered by Herings and Schmedders (2006).
terms of a CAPM that recognizes a number of risk factors. Pástor and Stambaugh (2003) and Acharya and Pedersen (2005) have recognized two or more risk factors, one of which is the market return (as in the classic CAPM) or aggregate consumption (as in the consumption-CAPM), and the others are meant to capture stochastic fluctuations in the degree of liquidity of the market, either taken as a whole or individually for each security. Liquidity fluctuations are proxied by fluctuations in volume or in the responsiveness of price to the order flow. The papers cited confirm that there exist in the marketplace significant risk premia related to these factors. Our model also identifies additional risk factors for the investors’ willingness to trade, in the form of shadow prices. However, there is one such per investor and they are not directly observable. We use our model to ascertain to what extent proxies used in the empirical literature are to any degree related to these shadow prices.

Indirect evidence on the existence of frictions in the market is provided by empirical anomalies or deviations from some anticipated properties of securities prices. In their recent survey, Gromb and Vayanos (2010) highlight the following anomalies: (a) short-run momentum, the tendency of an asset’s recent performance to continue into the near future; (b) long-run reversal, the tendency of performance measured over longer horizons to revert; (c) the value effect, the tendency of an asset’s ratio of price to accounting measures of value to predict negatively future returns; (d) the high volatility of asset prices relative to measures of discounted future payoff streams; and (e) post-earnings announcement drift, the tendency of stocks’ earning surprises to predict positively future returns. We comment below on the ability of our model to provide explanations of these anomalies.\(^9\)\(^{10}\)

After writing down our model and specifying the solution method (Section 1), we focus our work on two main questions. First, we ask in Section 2 whether equilibrium securities prices conform to the famous dictum of Amihud and Mendelson (1986a), which says that they are reduced by the present value of transactions costs. In Section 3, we examine the behavior of the market over time, asking, for instance, to what degree price changes and transactions volume are related to each other and what effects transactions costs have on the point process of transaction prices. In Section 4, we quantify the additional premia created by transactions costs, which are deviations from the consumption CAPM. These are the drags on expected-return that empiricists would encounter as a result of the presence of transactions costs.

\(^9\)Transactions costs also constitute a “limit to arbitrage” and offer a potential explanation of the observed fact that sometimes securities that are closely related to each other do not trade in the proper price relationship. For these deviations to appear in the first place, however, and subsequently not be obliterated by arbitrage, some category of investors must introduce some form of “demand shock”, that can only result from some departure from von Neumann-Morgenstern utility. Here, we consider only rational behavior so that no opportunities for (costly) arbitrage are present in equilibrium.

\(^{10}\)Empirical work has also been done by Chordia and Roll (2008) and others to track the dynamics of liquidity as it moves from one category of assets to another. In the present paper, the menu of assets is too limited to throw any light on the evidence presented by these papers.
1 Problem statement: the objective of each investor and the definition of equilibrium

We start with a population of two investors $l = 1, 2$ and a set of exogenous time sequences of individual endowments $\{e_{l,t} \in \mathbb{R}_{++}; l = 1, 2; t = 0, \ldots, T\}$ on a tree or lattice. For simplicity, we consider a binomial tree so that a given node at time $t$ is followed by two nodes at time $t+1$ at which the endowments are denoted $\{e_{l,t+1, u}, e_{l,t+1, d}\}$. The transition probabilities are denoted $\pi_{t,t+1,j}$ ($\sum_{j=u, d} \pi_{t,t+1,j} = 1$).\(^{11}\) Notice that the tree accommodates the exogenous state variables only.\(^{12}\)\(^{13}\)

In the financial market, there are two securities, defined by their payoffs $\{\delta_{t,i}; i = 1, 2; t = 0, \ldots, T\}$.\(^{14}\) The “ticker” prices of the securities, which are not always transactions prices, are denoted: $\{S_{t,i}; i = 1, 2; t = 0, \ldots, T\}$. The ticker price is an effective transaction price if and when a transaction takes place but it is posted all the time by the Walrasian auctioneering computer (which works at no cost).

Financial-market transactions entail deadweight, physical transactions costs. No one gets to pocket them. When an investor sells one unit of security $i$, turning it into consumption good, he receives the price reduced by $\varepsilon_{i,t}$ units of consumption goods and the buyer of the securities must give up $\lambda_{i,t}$ units. With symbol $\theta_{l,t,i}$ standing for the number of units of Security $i$ in the hands of Investor $l$ after all transactions of time $t$, Investor\(^{*}\)\(^{*}\) \(^{*}\) solves the following problem:\(^{15}\)

$$\sup_{\{e_t, \theta_t\}} \mathbb{E}_0 \sum_{t=0}^{T} u_t (\tilde{c}_{l,t}, t)$$

subject to:

- terminal conditions:
  $$\theta_{l,T,i} = 0,$$

\(^{11}\)Transition probabilities generally depend on the current state but we suppress that subscript.

\(^{12}\)As has been noted by Dumas and Lysasoff (2010), because the tree only involves the exogenous endowments, it can be chosen to be recombining when the endowments are Markovian, which is a great practical advantage compared to the global-solution approach, which would require a tree in which nodes must be distinguished not just on the basis of the values of the exogenous variables but also the endogenous ones.

\(^{13}\)It would be straightforward to write the equations below for more agents and more complex trees. The implementation of the solution technique is much more computationally intensive with more than two agents while it is not more complicated with a richer tree.

\(^{14}\)It so happens that, without transactions costs, the market would be complete. But the derivations and the solution technique depend neither on the number of branches in the tree, nor on the number of securities. We could solve for the equilibrium with transactions costs in a market that would be incomplete to start with.

\(^{15}\)The tilda $\tilde{~}$ is a notation we use to refer to a random variable.
• a sequence of flow budget constraints:

\[
c_{l,t,j} + \sum_{i=1,2} \left[ \theta_{l,t,i} - \theta_{l,t-1,i} \right]^+ (S_{t,i} + \lambda_{i,t}) + \sum_{i=1,2} \left[ \theta_{l,t,i} - \theta_{l,t-1,i} \right]^-(S_{t,i} - \varepsilon) = e_{l,t} \sum_{i=1,2} \theta_{l,t-1,i} \delta_{t,i}; \forall t \tag{1}\n\]

• and given initial holdings:\n
\[
\theta_{l,-1,i} = \tilde{\theta}_{l,i} \tag{2}\n\]

In the flow budget constraint, the term \(\sum_{i=1,2} \left[ \theta_{l,t,i} - \theta_{l,t-1,i} \right]^+ (S_{t,i} + \lambda_{i,t})\) reflects the cost of purchases and the term \(\sum_{i=1,2} \left[ \theta_{l,t,i} - \theta_{l,t-1,i} \right]^-(S_{t,i} - \varepsilon)\) captures the proceeds of sales of securities.

The dynamic programming formulation of the investor’s problem is:\n
\[
J_l (\{\theta_{l,t-1,i}\}, \cdot, e_{l,t}, t) = \sup_{c_{l,t}, \{\theta_{l,t,i}\}} u_l (c_{l,t}, t) + \mathbb{E}_t J_l (\{\theta_{l,t,i}\}, \cdot, \tilde{e}_{l,t+1}, t + 1)\n\]

subject to the flow budget constraint written at time \(t\) only.

Writing \(\theta_{l,t,i} = \tilde{\theta}_{l,t,i} + \hat{\theta}_{l,t,i} - \theta_{l,t-1,i}\), one can reformulate the same problem to make it more suitable for mathematical programming:

\[
J_l (\{\theta_{l,t-1,i}\}, \cdot, e_{l,t}, t) = \sup_{c_{l,t}, \{\hat{\theta}_{l,t,i}, \tilde{\theta}_{l,t,i}\}} u_l (c_{l,t}, t) \tag{3} + \mathbb{E}_t J_l \left( \left\{ \hat{\theta}_{l,t,i} + \tilde{\theta}_{l,t,i} - \theta_{l,t-1,i} \right\}, \tilde{e}_{l,t+1}, t + 1 \right) \]

subject to:

\[
c_{l,t} + \sum_{i=1,2} \left( \hat{\theta}_{l,t,i} - \tilde{\theta}_{l,t,i} \right) (S_{t,i} + \lambda_{i,t}) + \sum_{i=1,2} \left( \hat{\theta}_{l,t,i} - \tilde{\theta}_{l,t,i} \right) (S_{t,i} - \varepsilon_{i,t}) = e_{l,t} + \sum_{i=1,2} \theta_{l,t-1,i} \delta_{t,i} \tag{4} \]

\[
\hat{\theta}_{l,t,i} \leq \theta_{l,t-1,i} \leq \tilde{\theta}_{l,t,i} \tag{5} \]

\[\text{It is assumed that } \sum_{i=1,2} \hat{\theta}_{l,i} = 0 \text{ or } 1 \text{ depending on whether the security is assumed to be in zero or positive net supply.}\]

\[^{17}\text{The form } J_l (\{\theta_{l,t-1,i}\}, \cdot, e_{l,t}, t) \text{ in which the value function is written refers explicitly only to investor } l \text{'s individual state variables. The complete set of state variables actually used in the backward induction is chosen below.}\]
Definition 1: An equilibrium is defined as a process for the allocation of consumption \( c_{l,t,i} \), a process for securities prices \( \{S_{l,t,i}\} \) such that the supremum of (3) is reached for all \( l, i, j \) and \( t \) and the market-clearing conditions: \[ \sum_{t=1,2} \theta_{l,t,i} = 0 \text{ or } 1; t = 1, \ldots; T; i = 1, \ldots, 2 \] (6) are also satisfied with probability 1 at all times \( t = 1, \ldots, T \).

In Appendix A, we show, using a shift of equations proposed in the context of incomplete markets by Dumas and Lyasoff (2010), that the equilibrium can be calculated, for given initial values of some endogenous state variables, which are the dual variables \( \phi_{l,t,i} \), \( \{R_{l,t,i}\} \) — as opposed to given values of the original state variables, viz., initial positions \( \{\theta_{l,t-1,i}\} \) — by solving the following equation system written for \( l = 1, 2; j = u, d; i = 1, 2 \). The shift of equations amounts computationally to letting investors at time \( t \) plan their time-\( t+1 \) consumption \( c_{l,t+1,j} \) but choose their time-\( t \) portfolio \( \theta_{l,t,i} \) (which will finance the time-\( t+1 \) consumption).\(^{19}\)

1. First-order conditions for time \( t + 1 \) consumption:
   \[ u'_t (c_{l,t+1,j}, t+1) = \phi_{l,t+1,j} \]

2. The set of time-\( t+1 \) flow budget constraints for all investors and all states of nature of that time:
   \[ e_{l,t+1,j} + \sum_{i=1,2} \theta_{l,t,i} \delta_{t+1,i,j} - c_{l,t+1,j} \]
   \[ - \sum_{i=1,2} (\theta_{l,t+1,i,j} - \theta_{l,t,i}) (R_{l,t+1,i,j} + S_{l+1,i,j}) = 0 \]

3. The third subset of equations says that, when they trade them, all investors must agree on the prices of traded securities and, more generally, they must agree on the posted “ticker prices” inclusive of the shadow prices \( R \) that make units of paper securities less valuable than units of consumption. Because these equations, which, for given values of \( R_{l,t+1,i,j} \), are linear in the unknown state prices \( \phi_{l,t+1,j} \), restrict these to lie in a subspace, we call them the “kernel conditions”:

\[ -R_{l,t,i} + \frac{1}{\phi_{l,t}} \sum_{j=u,d} \pi_{l,t+1,j} \times \phi_{l,t+1,j} \times (\delta_{t+1,i,j} + R_{l,t+1,i,j} + S_{l+1,i,j}) \]
\[ = -R_{2,t,i} + \frac{1}{\phi_{2,t}} \sum_{j=u,d} \pi_{l,t+1,j} \times \phi_{2,t+1,j} \times (\delta_{t+1,i,j} + R_{2,t+1,i,j} + S_{l+1,i,j}) \]

\(^{18}\) One equates \( \sum_{t=1,2} \theta_{l,t} \) to 0 or 1 depending on whether the security is or is not in zero net supply.

\(^{19}\) \( u'_t \) denotes “marginal utility” or the derivative of utility with respect to consumption.
4. Definitions:
\[ \theta_{l,t+1,i,j} = \tilde{\theta}_{l,t+1,i,j} + \tilde{\theta}_{l,t+1,i,j} - \theta_{l,t,j} \]

5. Complementary-slackness conditions:
\begin{align*}
(-R_{l,t+1,i,j} + \lambda_{i,t+1,j}) \times (\tilde{\theta}_{l,t+1,i,j} - \theta_{l,t,i}) &= 0 \\
(R_{l,t+1,i,j} + \varepsilon_{i,t+1,j}) \times (\tilde{\theta}_{l,t,i} - \tilde{\theta}_{l,t+1,i,j}) &= 0
\end{align*}

6. Market-clearing restrictions:
\[ \sum_{l=1,2} \theta_{l,t,i} = 0 \text{ or } 1 \]

7. Inequalities:
\[ \tilde{\theta}_{l,t+1,i,j} \leq \theta_{l,t,i} \leq \tilde{\theta}_{l,t+1,i,j}; -\varepsilon_{i,t+1,j} \leq R_{l,t+1,i,j} \leq \lambda_{i,t+1,j}; \]

This is a system of 24 equations (not counting the inequalities) where the unknowns are \( \{ c_{l,t+1,j}, \phi_{l,t+1,j}, \theta_{l,t,i}, \tilde{\theta}_{l,t+1,i,j}, \tilde{\theta}_{l,t+1,i,j}; l = 1, 2; j = u, d \} \).

This is a total of 24 unknowns. We solve the system by means of the Interior-Point algorithm, in the implementation of Armand et al. (2008).

Besides the exogenous endowments \( e_{l,t+1,j} \), the “givens” are the time-\( t \) investor-specific shadow prices of consumption \( \{ \phi_{l,t}; l = 1, 2 \} \) and of paper securities \( \{ R_{l,t,i}; l = 1, 2; i = 1, 2 \} \), which must henceforth be treated as state variables and which we refer to as “endogenous state variables”. Actually, given the nature of the equations, the latter variables can be reduced to two state variables: \( \phi_{2,t} \times (R_{2,t,i} - R_{1,t,i}) \) and \( \frac{\phi_{1,t}}{\phi_{1,t} + \phi_{2,t}} \).

In addition, the securities’ prices \( S_{t+1,i,j} \) are obtained by backward induction (see, in Appendix A, the third equation in System (16)):

\[ S_{t,i} = -R_{t,i,j} + \frac{1}{\phi_{l,t}} \sum_{j=u,d} \pi_{t,t+1,j} \phi_{l,t+1,j} \times (\delta_{t+1,i,j} + R_{t+1,i,j} + S_{t+1,i,j}) ; \]
\[ S_{T,i} = 0; R_{T,i,j} = 0 \]

\[ ^{20} \text{However, the former is not bounded so that a proper range cannot be defined. For that reason, we decided not to reduce the dimension of the state space maximally and to use three state variables: } R_{2,t,i} \text{ -- } R_{1,t,i}, \phi_{2,t}, \phi_{2,t}, \text{ the first of which is naturally bounded. The two variables } \phi_{1,t} \text{ and } \phi_{2,t} \text{ are one-to-one related to the consumption shares of the two investors, so that consumption scales are actually used as state variables. Consumption shares of the two agents do not add up to 1 because of the deadweight loss in transactions costs.} \]
and the future positions \( \theta_{t,t+1,i,j} \) (satisfying \( \sum_{i=1,2} \theta_{t,t+1,i,j} = 0 \) or \( i = 1,..2 \)) are also obtained by an obvious backward induction of \( \theta_{t,t,i} \), the previous solution of the above system, with terminal conditions \( \theta_{T,i} = 0 \).

Moving back through time till \( t = 0 \), the last portfolio holdings we calculate are \( \theta_{t,0,i} \). These are the portfolios held by the investors as they exit time 0. We need to translate these into entering portfolios holdings so that we can meet the initial conditions (2). The way to do that is explained in Appendix B.

2 Equilibrium asset holdings and prices at the initial point in time

In our benchmark setup, we consider two investors who have isoelastic utility and have different coefficients of relative risk aversion. One of them only (Investor \( l = 1 \)) receives an endowment. The desire to trade arises from the difference in the endowments and the differences in risk aversion.

As for securities, the subscript \( i = 1 \) refers to a short-lived riskless security in zero net supply and the subscript \( i = 2 \) refers to equity also in zero net supply. We call “equity” a long-lived claim that pays the endowment of Investor 1 \((\delta = e_1)\). Transactions costs are levied on trades of equity shares (the “less liquid” asset); none are levied on trades of the riskless asset, which is also, therefore, the “more liquid” asset. The economy is of a finite-horizon type with \( T = 50 \). The single exogenous process is the endowment process of the first investor, which is represented by a binomial tree mimicking a geometric Brownian motion.

The numerical illustration below cannot in any way be seen as being calibrated to a real-world economy.\(^{22}\) As has been noted in the introduction, investors in our model trade because they have differing risk aversions while they have access only to a menu of linear assets. The imbalanced portfolios they have to hold because of transactions costs act as an inventory cost similar to the

\(^{21}\) Equation (8) is based on one additional but innocuous assumption. At the terminal date, after all payments have been made and all goods consumed, securities have zero price but are still nominally held by someone; we assume that no transactions costs are levied on the virtual liquidation trades that take place at zero price at date \( T \).

\(^{22}\) In this pure-exchange general-equilibrium economy, where equity is in zero net supply, total consumption is equal to total endowments. And, in order to limit the number of exogenous processes, we have set dividends on the zero-net supply equity equal to the endowment. In order to capture some properties of real-world equity, we choose a process for all of these that reflects the behavior of dividends. The following set of papers document dividend dynamics. Lettau and Ludvigson (2005) write: “An inspection of the dividend data from the CRSP value-weighted index [] reveals that [] the average annual growth rate of dividends has not declined precipitously over the period since 1978, or over the full sample. The average annual growth rate of real, per capita dividends is in fact higher, 5.6%, from 1978 through 1999, than the growth rate for the period 1948 to 1978. The annual growth rate for the whole sample (1948-2001) is 4.2%.” Volatility is reported to be 12.24%. Earlier evidence includes Campbell and Shiller (1988) who report for periods up to 1986 dividend growth rates of around 4%. Recently, van Binsbergen and Koijen (2010) estimate a growth rate of 5.89%.

A good mean value given this evidence is then probably to use a drift of 4.5% with a volatility of 13%.
cost incurred in inventory-management model of the Ho and Stoll (1980, 1983) variety. But our model does not include two other motives for trading that are obviously present in the real world such as the liquidity-trading motive (arising from missing securities and endowment shocks that would be incompletely hedgeable even in a market without transactions costs) and the speculative motive (arising from informed trading due either to private signals or to differences of opinion). Above all, we have two traders, not millions. For these reasons, although our goal is to capture a higher-frequency motive to trade, the amount of trading we are able to generate is not sufficient to match high-frequency data quantitatively. We, therefore, keep a yearly trading interval because we need to cover a sufficient number of years to get some reasonable amount of trading. Even so, we are going to document interesting patterns that match real-world data qualitatively.

In order to save on the total amount of computation, we assume that the rate at which transactions costs per share traded are levied is proportional to the economy’s endowment. Table 1 displays the per share transactions costs as a percentage of the endowment, whose initial value is equal to 1. This allows us to develop a property of scale invariance: all the nodes of a given point in time, which differ only by their value of the exogenous variable, are isomorphic to each other, where the isomorphy simply means that we can factor out the endowment. In this way, we do not need to perform a new calculation for each node of a given point in time; one suffices. This property, which we prove in Appendix C, holds even though investors have different risk aversions.\footnote{Remarkably, the property is valid when \( R_{2,t,i} = R_{1,t,i} \phi_{1,t} \phi_{2,t} \) are used as endogenous state variables of the backward recursion. With different risk aversions across investors, it would not have held if the endogenous state variables had been \( \{ \theta_{t-1,i} \} \), the portfolios held when entering each point in time \( t \).}

Table 1 shows all the parameter values.\footnote{The initial holdings of equity \( \theta_{1,2} \) by Investor 1 are just that. Separately, Investor 1 receives his/her endowment, which is the same stream of consumption units as the equity stream. In total, when \( \theta_{1,2} = -0.3 \), Investor 1 collects 70\% of the endowment stream.} The risk aversion of Investor 1 is lower than that of Investor 2, so that Investor 1 is a natural borrower, as far as the riskless short-term security is concerned.\footnote{The endowment value at the initial point in time is set at 1 consumption unit and the equilibrium price of the stock that will pay a dividend for 50 years is found to be near 25.6 consumption units (see Figure 4, Panel (b)). Therefore, our benchmark transactions cost of 5\% endowment \times number of shares traded amounts to approximately equal to 5\%/25.6 \approx 0.2\% of the value of the shares traded.}

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Table 1: **Parameter Values and Benchmark Values of the State Variables.** This table lists the parameter values used for all the figures in the paper. The table also indicates the benchmark values of state variables, which are reference values taken by all state variables except for the particular one being varied in a given graph.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Symbol</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Range</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Parameters for exogenous endowment</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Horizon of the economy</td>
<td>$T$</td>
<td>50 years</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expected growth rate of endowment</td>
<td></td>
<td>3.9%/yr</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time step of the tree</td>
<td></td>
<td>1 year</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volatility of endowment</td>
<td></td>
<td>16.2%/year</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Initial endow. at $t = 0$ (cons. units)</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Parameters for the investors</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Investor 1’s risk aversion</td>
<td>$\gamma_1$</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Investor 2’s risk aversion</td>
<td>$\gamma_2$</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Investor 1’s time preference</td>
<td>$\beta_1$</td>
<td>0.975</td>
<td>[0.95, 0.99]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Investor 2’s time preference</td>
<td>$\beta_2$</td>
<td>0.975</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Transactions costs (as a fraction of endowment) per equity share traded</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>When buying and when selling</td>
<td>$\lambda/e_1 = \varepsilon/e_1$</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>[0.01%, 10%]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Benchmark values of the variables</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Initial hold. of riskless asset by Inv. 1</td>
<td>$\theta_{1,1}$</td>
<td>-5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Initial holding of equity by Investor 1</td>
<td>$\theta_{1,2}$</td>
<td>-0.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure 1: **Equilibrium no-trade region.** Panel (a) shows the no-trade region for different "entering" positions $\theta$ of the agents. Setup is as described in Table 1 with transactions costs equal to $5\% \times$ endowment $\times$ #shares. Panel (b) shows the no-trade region for different levels of transaction costs from 0% to 10%. Parameters are as in Table 1. Consumption shares are set at the value corresponding to the initial holdings of Table 1.

2.1 Equilibrium asset holdings

It is well-known from the literature on non-equilibrium portfolio choice that proportional transactions costs cause the investors to tolerate a deviation from their preferred holdings. The zone of tolerated deviation is called the "no-trade region". In previous work, the no-trade region had been derived for a given stochastic process of securities prices. We now obtain the no-trade region in general equilibrium, when two investors make analogous portfolio decisions and prices are set to clear the market. The result is analogous to the no-trade region of the equilibrium shipping model of Dumas (1992) with the difference that the trades considered are not costly arbitrages between geographic regions in which physical resources have different prices but are, instead, costly arbitrages between people whose private valuations of paper securities differ.

2.1.1 Equilibrium no-trade region

Figure 1, Panel (a) plots the no-trade region for the different values of the initial holdings of securities. The lighter grey zone is specifically the no-trade region while the darker zone is the trade region. When, the holdings with which Investor 1 enters the trading date are in the trade region, the investors trade to reach the edge of the no-trade region; to the contrary, when the holdings upon entering the trading date are within the no-trade region, the investors do
nothing. The crescent shape of the no-trade zone is the result of the difference in risk aversions between the two investors: there exists a curve (not shown) inside the zone which would be the locus of holdings in a frictionless, complete market. The white zone of the figure, on both sides of the dark grey zone, is not admissible; if entering holdings are in that zone, there exists no equilibrium as one investor would, at equilibrium prices, be unable to repay his/her negative positions to the other investor. Panel (b) of the same figure displays, for the benchmark values of the variables, the width of the no-trade region against the rate of transactions costs.

Figure 2 shows, against the rate of transactions costs, the holdings of the stock and bond with which Investor 1 exits a trading period in which he enters with initial holdings \((-5, -0.3)\). While this investor is a natural borrower and thus chooses negative positions in the bond, increased transactions costs induce him to carry on with a smaller holding of equity. For that reason, he has to borrow less.

2.1.2 The clientele effect

Do more patient investors hold less liquid assets as in the “clientele effect” of Amihud and Mendelson (1986)? We now vary the patience parameter of the first investor between 0.95 and 0.99. Figure 3 provides a clear illustration of the clientele effect: as Investor 1 becomes more patient, he/she holds more of the stock, which is the illiquid security and less of the short-term bond, which
Figure 3: **Clientele effect.** Panel (a) shows the optimal bond holdings of the first agent for different levels of patience, in the range from 0.95 to 0.99. All other parameters are as described in Table 1. Especially, transactions costs equal 5%. Panel (b) similar for the optimal stock holdings.

is the more liquid one. The result, however, depends very much on the initial holdings, here assumed to be 0 of the short-term bond and −0.5 of the stock.

### 2.2 Asset prices

According to Amihud and Mendelson (1986a, Page 228), the price of a security in the presence of transactions costs is equal to the present value of the dividends to be paid on that security minus the present value of transactions costs subsequently to be paid by someone currently holding that security. A similar conclusion was reached by Vayanos (1998, Page 18, Equation (31)) and Vayanos and Vila (1999, Page 519, Equation (5.12)).

There are many differences between our setting and the setting of Amihud and Mendelson. They consider a large collection of risk-neutral investors each of whom faces different transactions costs and are forced to trade. We consider two investors who are risk averse, face identical trading conditions and trade optimally. Nonetheless, their statement is an appealing conjecture to be investigated using our model.

Recall from Equation (8) that the securities’ ticker prices $S_{t+1,i,j}$ are:

\[
S_{t,i} = -R_{t,t,i} + E_t \left[ \frac{\phi_{t+1}}{\phi_{t}} \times (\delta_{t+1,i} + R_{t,t+1,i} + S_{t+1,i}) \right]; \\
S_{T,i} = 0; R_{t,T,i} = 0
\]

where the terms $R_{t,t,i}$ ($-\varepsilon_{i,t} \leq R_{t,t,i} \leq \lambda_{i,t}$) capture the effect of current and anticipated trading costs.
We now present two comparisons. First, we compare equilibrium prices to the present value of dividends on security $i$ calculated at the equilibrium state prices under transactions costs of Investor $l$. We denote this private valuation $S_{t,i,l}$:

**Definition 2**

$$S_{t,i,l} = \frac{1}{\phi_{t,i}} \sum_{j=u,d} \pi_{t,t+1,j} \phi_{t+1,i,j} \times \left( \delta_{t+1,i,j} + S_{t+1,i,j} \right); \hat{S}_{T,i} = 0$$

We show that:

**Proposition 3**

$$S_{t,i} = -R_{t,i} + S_{t,i,l}$$

which means that the ticker prices of securities can at most differ from the present value of their dividends as seen by Investor $l$ by the value of the transactions costs paid by Investor $l$ at the current trading date only.

**Proof.** The proof is by induction. At date $t = T - 1$, the present value of dividends $\delta$ at time $T - 1$ is given by:

$$\hat{S}_{T-1,i,l} = \mathbb{E}_{T-1} \left[ \frac{\phi_{t,T}}{\phi_{t,T-1}} \times \delta_{T,i} \right]$$

The stock price is given by:

$$S_{T-1,i} = -R_{t,T-1} + \mathbb{E}_{T-1} \left[ \frac{\phi_{t,T}}{\phi_{t,T-1}} \times \delta_{T,i} \right] = -R_{t,T-1} + \hat{S}_{T-1,i,l}$$

At $t = T - 2$, the present value of dividends is:

$$\hat{S}_{T-2,i,l} = \mathbb{E}_{T-2} \left[ \frac{\phi_{t-1,T}}{\phi_{t,T-2}} \times \left( \delta_{T-1,i} + \hat{S}_{T-1,i,l} \right) \right]$$

while the stock price is:

$$S_{T-2,i} = -R_{t,T-2} + \mathbb{E}_{T-2} \left[ \frac{\phi_{t-1,T}}{\phi_{t,T-2}} \times \left( \delta_{T-1,i} + R_{t,T-1} + S_{T-1,i} \right) \right]$$

$$= -R_{t,T-2} + \mathbb{E}_{T-2} \left[ \frac{\phi_{t-1,T}}{\phi_{t,T-2}} \times \left( \delta_{T-1,i} + \hat{S}_{T-1,i,l} \right) \right]$$

$$= -R_{t,T-2} + \hat{S}_{T-2,i,l}$$

where we used equation (10) to replace $S_{T-1,i}$, etc. ■

Second, we compare equilibrium asset prices that prevail in the presence of transactions costs to those that would prevail in a frictionless economy, based, that is, on state prices that would obtain under zero transactions costs. Denoting
all quantities in the zero-transactions costs economy with an asterisk *, and defining:

$$\Delta \phi_{t,t} = \frac{\phi_{t,t}^*}{\phi_{t,t-1}} - \frac{\phi_{t,t}}{\phi_{t,t-1}}$$

we show that:

**Proposition 4**

$$S_{t,j} - S_{t,t}^* = R_{t,t,i} - \mathbb{E}_t \left[ \sum_{j=t+1}^{T} \frac{\phi_{t,j-1}}{\phi_{t,t}} \Delta \phi_{t,j} (\delta_j + S_j^*) \right]$$

(11)

**Proof.** In Appendix D ■

That is, the two asset prices differ by two components: (i) the current shadow price $R_{t,t}$ from which we know that it is at most as big as the one-way transactions costs, (ii) the present value of all future price differences arising from the change in state prices and consumption induced by the presence of transactions costs.

Figure 4, Panel (b) plots the ticker price and the present value of dividends for different values of transactions costs, thus illustrating the decomposition of Equation (9). The result is as expected from our analytical derivations. The difference between them is in the range $[-5\%, +5\%]$ of endowment, where we achieve the boundaries of this range when the system is in the trade region. For the no-trade region, it is somewhere within the range.

While the ticker price and the present value of dividends differ from each other at most by one round of transactions costs, both of them are reduced by the presence of transactions costs because, over some range, the state prices $\phi$ are lower with transactions costs than without them. Panel (c) of the same figure illustrates the decomposition of Equation (11). The reason for the drop is not that the investors pay big amounts of transaction costs in the future but that they do not hold the optimal frictionless holdings and, therefore, also have consumption schemes that differ from those that would be optimal in the absence of transactions costs. The differences in consumption schemes then influence the state prices and accordingly the present values of dividends. Beyond some level of transactions costs, however, the effect of state prices on the initial price reverses itself because a general reduction of the future consumption level increases marginal utilities while, as a matter of definition, equity payoffs are left untouched. Vayanos (1998) had already noted that prices can be higher in the presence of transactions costs.

Because the affected state prices are applied by investors to all securities, the change in the state prices is also reflected in the one-period bond price which varies (non monotonically) as we vary the transactions costs applied to equity, as is illustrated in Panel (a) of Figure 4.
Figure 4: **Initial asset prices.** Panel (a) shows the initial period’s bond price for different levels of transactions costs in the range from 0% to 10%. All parameters and variables are set at their benchmark values indicated in Table 1 (entering holdings $(-5, -0.3)$). Panel (b) shows the initial period’s stock price and the two agents present values of dividends $S_{t,i}$ for different levels of transactions costs. Panel (c) shows the difference between the initial stock price in an economy with without transactions costs and the stock price in economies with transactions costs. In addition, we show the component of the stock price difference that is due to the current amount of transactions costs.
3 Time paths of prices and holdings

We now study the behavior of the equilibrium over time and the transactions that take place. Figure 5 displays a simulated sample path illustrating how our financial market with transactions costs operates over time. Although the economy runs for 50 periods ($T = 50$), in an attempt to remove the effects of the finite horizon on trade decisions, we only display the first 25 periods.²⁶

Panel (a) shows a sample path of stock holdings and Panel (b) shows the stock ticker price (expressed in units of the consumption good), with transaction dates highlighted by a circle. While the ticker price forms a continuous broken line, transactions prices materialize as a “point process”. Panel (c) displays the individual-investor valuations (i.e., present values of dividends) as a difference with the ticker price, as in decomposition (9). The ticker price is thus seen as an average of the two private valuations. When the two valuations differ by more than the sum of the one-way transaction costs for the two investors, a transaction takes place. The direction of the trade depends, of course, on the sign of the difference between private valuations. The increments in the private valuations of Investor 1 are more highly correlated with the increments in the ticker price than those of Investor 2. In fact, Investor 2 does not buy on an up move in the ticker price. In our benchmark example, Investor 1 has a lower risk aversion. Although ours remains a Walrasian market and not a dealer market, Investor 1 is closer to the proverbial “market maker” of the Microstructure literature, who is traditionally assumed to be risk neutral, and Investor 2 may be viewed as a “customer”. If we wanted to push the analogy further, we could define the “bid” and the “ask” prices as being equal to Investor 1’s private valuation plus and minus transactions costs and we would call a purchase by Investor 2 a “buy”.²⁷

Panel (d) of the figure shows the fluctuations of Amihud’s LIQ measure, which is defined below. It will be useful to us later on.

Finally, Panels (e) and (f) illustrate decomposition (11) over time. Deviations are here expressed relative to the price as it would be at transactions costs of zero. For example, for the bond, the quantity is: $\frac{S_{1,t}^* - S_{1,t}}{S_{1,t}}$ where $S_{1,t}^*$ denotes the price in a zero-transactions cost economy. The price of the stock is almost always reduced by the presence of transactions costs but such is not the case for the bond. Panel (f) shows, again in relative terms, the components of the difference between the stock price in a zero transactions costs economy and an economy with transactions costs, along the same path, as seen by Investor 1. The components are due to the current amount of (shadow or actual) transactions costs and to the future difference in pricing (state prices). The number of shares traded is such that the current amount of transactions costs hardly ever exceeds

²⁶If the equilibrium of this economy had been a stationary one, it would also have been useful to introduce a number of “run-in” periods, in a attempt to render the statistical results of this section independent of initial conditions. But, with investors of different risk aversions, no equilibrium is stationary.

²⁷The pattern is reminiscent of Lee and Ready (1991) but would be opposite to their rule. When, in empirical work, the direction of trade is not observed, they recommend to classify the transaction as a buy if it occurs on an “uptick”.

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25bp of the value of the stock.\textsuperscript{28}

We now demonstrate some properties of the sample paths. We first investigate univariate properties of trades on the one hand and of asset price increments on the other. Then we investigate bivariate properties of trades and price changes.

\subsection*{3.1 Trades over time}

We examine the trading volume and the average waiting time between trades. The trading volume is defined as the sum of the absolute values of changes in $\theta_2$ (shares of the stock) over the first 25 periods of the tree.

Figure 6 is as one would expect it to be. The trading volume decreases with transactions costs and converges to the limit of 0.5. Here, we include the trades at time 0 and at time $T$. Since the investor starts with $\theta_2 = -0.3$ and terminates with a zero holding, the lower bound on volume is 0.3. The waiting time increases from 1, i.e., trading at each node, to about 4 (and the volume per trade (not shown) also increases).

\subsection*{3.2 Total and quadratic variation of prices}

We are interested in determining in which way, as one decreases transactions costs, the point process of transactions prices approaches the process that would prevail in the absence of transactions costs, which in the limit of continuous time would be a continuous process. As is well-known, the Brownian motion is characterized by the fact that its total variation, calculated over a finite period of time, is infinite while its quadratic variation is finite.\textsuperscript{29} To discuss the limit, we generate many simulated paths of the stock price for zero transactions cost and calculate average (across paths) total variation and quadratic variation over the first 25 periods. Then we generate the same paths of transactions prices and holdings with transactions costs increasing to 10\% and we calculate again average (across paths) total variation and quadratic variation. These are plotted against transactions costs in Figure 7.

The total variation of the ticker price is practically invariant to transactions costs. It is finite because this is a finite tree but, if one took the limit of continuous time, it would be infinite, as is the case for Brownian motions. When reducing transactions costs, transactions become more and more frequent and the total variation of the transactions prices rises rapidly to approach the total variation of the ticker price but then is capped by it. If one took the limit to continuous time, it would also approach infinity.

As can be expected from the nature of the tree, the quadratic variation of the ticker price is approximately constant (note the vertical scale). The quadratic

\textsuperscript{28}Figure below shows that, for a 5\% transactions cost, which, as we saw, corresponds approximately to 1\% of the value of a trade, the average number of shares traded is approximately 0.22.

\textsuperscript{29}Total variation is the sum of the absolute values of the segments making up a path or connecting the dots, whereas quadratic variation is the sum of their squares.
Figure 5: Sample time paths of stock holdings, the stock price and the difference between the stock price and each investor's value of the present value of dividends. Panel (a) shows stock holdings of the first agent along the paths for zero and 5% transactions costs. All parameters and variables are set at their benchmark values indicated in Table 1 (time-0 holdings (−5, −0.3)). Panel (b) shows the stock ticker price along the sample path for 5% transactions costs. Panel (c) shows the present values of future dividends for the two agents along the same path. Transactions are highlighted by a circle. Panel (d) shows Amihud’s LIQ measure along the same path. Panel (e) shows the relative deviation between the asset price in a zero transactions economy and an economy with transactions costs along the same path. Panel (f) shows the components of the difference between the stock price in a zero transactions costs economy and an economy with transactions costs, along the same path.
Figure 6: **Trading volume and waiting time against transactions costs.** Panel (a) shows the stock trading volume up to period 25 for different levels of transactions costs, in the range from 0% to 10%. All parameters and variables are set at their benchmark values indicated in Table 1. We use 20,000 simulations along the tree. Panel (b) shows the waiting time between trades computed the same way.

Figure 7: **Total and quadratic variations of stock price depending on transactions costs.** Panel (a) shows the total variation (defined in footnote 29) up to period 25 for different levels of transactions costs, in the range from 0% to 10%. All parameters and variables are set at their benchmark values indicated in Table 1. We use 20,000 simulations along the tree. Panel (b) shows the quadratic variation computed the same way.
Figure 8: **Liquidity variables.** Panel (a) shows Amihud’s LIQ measure, computed using results up to period 25 for different levels of transactions costs, in the range from 0% to 10%. All parameters and variables are set at their benchmark values indicate din table 1. We use 20,000 simulations along the tree. Panel (b) shows Kyle’s lambda, computed in the same way using Madhavan-Smidt regression.

variation of the transactions prices rises modestly.

### 3.3 Joint behavior of transactions prices, inventories and trades

We now explore the joint behavior of prices and transactions, which is a favorite topic of the empirical Microstructure literature, aiming to measure the “price impact” of trades.\(^{30}\) Much of the literature relates price impacts to traders’ hedging and speculative motives (the latter arising from the presence of informed traders). We want to determine whether the empirical phenomena that have been unearthed are truly related to these motives or, in a more mundane fashion, to transactions costs and the heterogeneity of tastes of the investor population.

The most popular method for measuring price impact is the ILLIQ measure of Amihud (2002). We interpret it as being equal to the average over time of the absolute values of the change in the price divided by the contemporaneous absolute volume of trade. We entertain two versions of it, one computed from ticker price changes and one computed from transactions price changes. When dealing with ticker prices, there are nodes with zero trades. We prefer, therefore, to compute a LIQ measure equal to the average of volume of trade over the absolute price change.

\(^{30}\)See the surveys by Biais et al. (2005), Amihud et al. (2005), the monographs by Hasbrouck (2007) and by de Jong and Rindi (2009), and the works of Roll (1984), Campbell et al. (1993), llorente et al. (2002) and Sadka (2006).
In Figure 5, we have exhibited the fluctuations of LIQ along a sample path and the way it varies with the volume of trade and the shadow prices of investors. Figure 8, Panel (a) shows how LIQ, which is commonly used to estimate effective trading costs, is related to the given transactions costs of our model. We compute, at each node where there is a trade, the price change since the last trade as well as the purchase or sale at that node and collect the ratios of those. We then compute the average. The figure shows that LIQ is monotonically related to trading costs. The variation demonstrates that LIQ cannot generally be interpreted purely as a measure of the degree of informed trading present in the marketplace.

More formal methods to measure price impact are based on reduced forms of theoretical Microstructure models. Some are motivated by the desire to capture informed trading (Roll (1984), extended by Glosten and Harris (1988)). Others (Ho and Macris (1984)) are motivated by inventory considerations. Madhavan and Smidt (1991) run a regression which is meant to capture both effects. We implement their idea in the following way. At each node where there is a trade, we collect the price change since the last trade, the signed amount of purchase or sale by Investor 2 and the current equity holding of Investor 1. We then regress, across nodes of various times, the price change on these two variables. The responsiveness of price to order quantity, often referred to as Kyle’s $\lambda$ is displayed in Figure 8, Panel (b) against transactions costs. It is also mostly rising with transactions costs. The variation demonstrates that Kyle’s $\lambda$ cannot generally be interpreted purely as a measure of the degree of informed trading present in the marketplace.

3.4 “Anomalies”: momentum, reversals and post-earnings announcement drift

We now investigate leading anomalies such as: (a) short-run momentum, the tendency of an asset’s recent performance to continue into the near future and (b) long-run reversal, the tendency of performance measured over longer horizons to revert.31 We want to determine whether transactions costs might be an explanation for these empirically observed phenomena. In order to elicit patterns over time, we sort the nodes into two groups based on their last period return (above or below the ex ante conditional return, dubbed “up” and “down” nodes). The curves show the one-period ahead conditional expected return of the two groups of nodes. We can see on Panel (a) of Figure 9 that the short-term serial correlation is negative but not monotonic against transactions costs: these seem to have no clear effect. Panel (c) shows the difference between the two curves of Panel (a); it is approximately equal to 5 to 6bp per year.

To ascertain long-term reversals, we make the same calculation but with a number of periods to which we go back equal to four. The reversal effect is not present: the one-period ahead conditional expected return is actually again

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31See, for example, Jegadeesh & Titman (1993) for evidence on short-run momentum, and DeBondt & Thaler (1985) for long-run reversal.
Figure 9: **Short-term momentum and long-term momentum or reversals in ticker price returns:** in Panel (a) we sort the nodes into two groups based on their last period return (above or below the ex ante conditional return, dubbed “up” and “down” nodes). The curves show the one-period ahead conditional expected return of the two groups of nodes. The computation is done on the first 25 periods of the tree. All parameters and variables are set at their benchmark values indicated in Table 1. Panel (b) is obtained similarly except that we compute for each node at time $t$ the realized return over the last 4 (3) periods and sort the node into two groups again. We then display again the one-period expected returns for the two groups. Panel (c) just shows the difference between the two curves of Panel (a).
higher for nodes for which past four-year returns have been above the mean.

The post-earnings announcement drift (PEAD) is the tendency of stocks’ earning surprises to predict positively future returns.\textsuperscript{32} Momentum and PEAD are one and the same phenomenon. The only difference is that, for PEAD, one specifies what piece of news one is looking at that moves the price, whereas, for momentum, one considers any unspecified news item that moves the price. In the case of our model, we can regard up moves of the endowment as a positive earnings-announcement surprise but that is the only possible piece of news anyway. So, there is really no difference since, indeed, an up node always produces an up move in the price. Hence, Figure (a) can be regarded as a replication of the classic PEAD evidence presented, e.g., in Bernard & Thomas (1989).

4 The pricing of liquidity and of liquidity risk

4.1 Deviations from the classic CAPM under transactions costs

In our equilibrium, the capital-asset pricing model is Equation (8) above. The dual variables $R$ (in addition to the intertemporal marginal rates of substitution $\phi$) drive the prices of assets that are subject to transactions costs, as do, in the “LAPM” of Holmström and Tirole (2001), the shadow prices of the liquidity constraints.\textsuperscript{33}

It can be rewritten as:\textsuperscript{34}

\begin{equation}
\mathbb{E}_t [r_{l,t+1,i}] - r_{1,t+1} = -\text{cov}_t \left[ r_{l,t+1,i}, \frac{\phi_{l,t+1}}{\mathbb{E}_t [\phi_{l,t+1}]} \right] ; i \neq 1
\end{equation}

where:

\begin{equation}
1 + r_{l,t+1,i,j} = \frac{\delta_{t+1,i,j} + R_{l,t+1,i,j} + S_{l+1,i,j}}{S_{t,i} + R_{l,t,i}}
\end{equation}

is the shadow return inclusive of transactions costs from the point of view of Investor $l$ and where Asset #1 is the security that is riskless and not subject to transactions costs. It is to be noted that the \textit{very definition of a rate of return} and, consequently, expected returns and risk premia differ across investors.

We can go through a decomposition exercise similar to that performed by Acharya and Pedersen (2005). We break up the return into a component $\tau$ that is related to transactions costs and one $\hat{r}$ that is not so related (although, literally

\textsuperscript{32}See Bernard & Thomas (1989).

\textsuperscript{33}Holmstrom and Tirole (2001) assume that their liquidity constraint is always binding. Here, we allow the inequality constraints (5) to hold whenever it is optimal for them to do so.

\textsuperscript{34}Recall that the security numbered $i = 2$ is equity and the security numbered $i = 1$ is the short-term bond.
speaking, both would be different in the absence of time $t+1$ transactions costs):

$$
\tau_{l,t+1,i,j} \triangleq \frac{R_{l,t+1,i,j}}{S_{l,t} + R_{l,t,i}}; \quad 1 + \hat{r}_{l,t+1,i,j} \triangleq \frac{\delta_{l+1,i,j} + S_{l+1,i,j}}{S_{l,i} + R_{l,t,i}}
$$

$$
1 + \tau_{l,t+1,i,j} \equiv 1 + \hat{r}_{l,t+1,i,j} + \tau_{l,t+1,i,j}
$$

With that notation, the CAPM in our equilibrium is:

$$
\mathbb{E}_t [\hat{r}_{l,t+1,i}] - r_{1,t+1} = -\mathbb{E}_t [\tau_{l,t+1,i}] - \text{cov}_t \left[ \hat{r}_{l,t+1,i}, \frac{\phi_{l,t+1}}{\mathbb{E}_t [\phi_{l,t+1}]} \right] - \text{cov}_t \left[ \tau_{l,t+1,i}, \frac{\phi_{l,t+1}}{\mathbb{E}_t [\phi_{l,t+1}]} \right]
$$

Were it not for the presence of the shadow price $R_{l,t,i}$ in the denominator of its definition, a number which is small compared to the ticker price $S_{l,i}$, the rate of return $\hat{r}$ would practically be equal to the rate of return observable on the ticker tape.

We now define deviations from the classic consumption CAPM that occur in our equilibrium as:

**Definition 5**

$$
\text{CAPM deviation} \triangleq \mathbb{E}_t [\hat{r}_{l,t+1,i}] - r_{1,t+1} + \text{cov}_t \left[ \hat{r}_{l,t+1,i}, \frac{\phi_{l,t+1}}{\mathbb{E}_t [\phi_{l,t+1}]} \right] = -\mathbb{E}_t [\tau_{l,t+1,i}] - \text{cov}_t \left[ \tau_{l,t+1,i}, \frac{\phi_{l,t+1}}{\mathbb{E}_t [\phi_{l,t+1}]} \right]
$$

(13)

Because it involves the shadow prices, the deviation is specific to each investor $l$. Equation (13) says that the deviation from the classic CAPM is the sum of expected transactions costs (or expected liquidity) and a premium for the liquidity risk created by transactions costs. Figure 10 Panels (a) and (b) show the deviations from the classic consumption CAPM, computed using results up to period 25 for different levels of transactions costs, in the range from 0% to 10%.36 \textit{“Component 1”} is the expected liquidity premium $-\mathbb{E}_t [\tau_{l,t+1,i}]$; \textit{“component 2”} is the liquidity risk premium $-\text{cov}_t \left[ \tau_{l,t+1,i}, \frac{\phi_{l,t+1}}{\mathbb{E}_t [\phi_{l,t+1}]} \right]$.

In Amihud and Mendelson (1986a), it was explained that that premium should be concave in the size of transactions costs. For that reason, Amihud and Mendelson (1986b) fitted the cross section of equity portfolio returns to the log of the bid-ask spread of the previous period and found a highly significant relationship. Our figure does not exhibit that concavity property.37

35In order to match even further the empirical findings of Acharya and Pedersen, we could further split $\frac{\phi_{l,t+1}}{\mathbb{E}_t [\phi_{l,t+1}]}$ into its value $\frac{\phi_{l,t+1}}{\mathbb{E}_t [\phi_{l,t+1}]}$ as it would be in the absence of transactions costs and a component related to transactions costs. That may not be necessary.

36Recall that, in terms of values of trades, the rate of transactions costs would be reduced by a factor of about 25, the approximate value of a share of stock.

37See also Figure 3.1 in Amihud et al. (2005). The analogy between what we do and what they do is not perfect as they display a cross-section of firms affected differently by transactions costs and we display a single premium for different levels of transactions costs. But the underlying rationale is identical.
Figure 10: CAPM deviations. Panels (a) and (b) show the deviations from the classic consumption CAPM, computed using results up to period 25 for different levels of transactions costs, in the range from 0% to 10%. “Component 1” is the expected liquidity premium; “component 2” is the liquidity risk premium. All parameters and variables are set at their benchmark values indicated in table 1.

Based on a pure portfolio-choice reasoning, Constantinides (1986) argued that transactions costs make little difference to risk premia in the financial market. Liu and Lowenstein (2002) and Dumas and Puopolo (2010), still on the basis of portfolio choice alone, challenge that view by pointing out that the conclusion of Constantinides holds only when rates of return are identically, independently distributed (IID) over time. Here, we have gone one step further than these authors, in that we now have the deviations in a full general-equilibrium model, when endowments are IID but returns themselves are not and investors must also face the uncertainty about the dates at which they can trade. In our very simple benchmark setup, the deviation reaches 10 to 30bp.

As expected, the absolute CAPM deviation is increasing in transactions costs. The CAPM deviation is positive for the first investor, i.e., the less risk-averse investor demands a higher expected return in an economy with transactions costs whereas the more risk-averse Investor 2 demands a lower expected return. This is due to the fact that the covariance between the first investor’s pricing kernel and the τ return, i.e., liquidity risk, is positive.

4.2 Liquidity and asset pricing

In our CAPM (12), rates of return are based on payoffs \( \delta_{t+1,i,j} + R_{t,t+1,i,j} + S_{t+1,i,j} \), where the shadow prices that differentiate capital gains from consumption payoffs are present, as they are in the time \( t \) price \( S_{t,i} + R_{t,t,i} \). These shadow prices are generally not observable. If one wanted to test our CAPM, one would not use the standard concept of rate of return measured between fixed points.
in time. Instead, one would use transactions prices only, which do not occur at fixed time intervals, and one would substitute out the values of prices that are unobserved for lack of transaction.\textsuperscript{38} That, however, is not the way empirical tests have been conducted by previous authors.

In Acharya and Pedersen (2005) and Pástor and Stambaugh (2003), tests were conducted on a cross-section of monthly portfolio returns, looking at changes in market liquidity as a new risk factor. In Figure 5, we have displayed a sample path of the time variation of an empirical measure of liquidity. It is seen to fluctuate widely over time. For that reason, liquidity fluctuations, in addition to current and expected liquidity, have been regarded as a source of risk, and as a risk that receives a price in the market place. Our model, however, says that liquidity risk should be captured by the fluctuations in the shadow prices $R$, not by the empirical variable $LIQ$. We now ask whether $LIQ$ is a good substitute for the right measure. To address that question, we need to compare sample paths. That is done in the new Figure 11 which shows correlations between the two variables. We conclude that $LIQ$ seems to only capture liquidity risk in a time-series dimension for small transactions costs values. For reasonable values of transactions costs, the correlation between these variables is close to zero, which means that $LIQ$ is not an adequate proxy in tests of the CAPM.\textsuperscript{39}

Sadka (2006) has explained the momentum and PEAD anomalies as being reflections of the price of illiquidity risk. He fitted empirically a CAPM with liquidity risk and observed that, when returns are adjusted by the liquidity risk premium, as captured by $ILLIQ$ fluctuations, the momentum and the PEAD anomalies were no longer present.\textsuperscript{40} In order to conduct a similar test on the results of our model, we now redo Figure 9, Panels (a) and (c) of Figure 12 after correcting returns for the two CAPM terms corresponding to expected liquidity and liquidity risk, as in (13). The result is Figure 12. The momentum and PEAD anomalies becomes stronger for the first investor if we correct for the CAPM terms whereas it becomes much weaker and vanishes for the second, more risk-averse, investor. The effect can be explained as follows: for the first investor the CAPM deviation is negative at the up-node and positive at the down-node. If we correct now for this, the PEAD becomes stronger and inverse for Investor 2. Our theory does not seem to provide a justification for Sadka’s empirical procedure.

5 Conclusion

We have developed a new method to compute financial-market equilibria in the presence of proportional transactions costs. For a given rate of transactions costs, our method delivers the optimal, market-clearing moves of each investor and the resulting ticker and transactions prices.

\textsuperscript{38}See the discussion on page 89 of Hasbrouck (2007).
\textsuperscript{39}The behavior is similar for both agents, only with a reversed sign due to the restriction on the $R$ variables.
\textsuperscript{40}Sadka introduces a liquidity risk premium but not expected liquidity.
Figure 11: Correlation between the LIQ variable and the shadow prices $R$ of the two agents. The computation uses results up to period 25 for different levels of transactions costs, in the range from 0% to 10%. All parameters and variables are set at their benchmark values indicate din table 1. We use 20,000 simulations along the tree.
Figure 12: Sadka’s liquidity explanation of momentum and PEAD: difference between one-period ahead expected ticker-price return, corrected for expected liquidity and liquidity risk premia, computed using results up to period 25 for different levels of transactions costs, in the range from 0% to 10%. All parameters and variables are set at their benchmark values indicate din table 1. We use 20,000 simulations along the tree.
We have used it to show the effect of transactions costs on asset prices, on deviations from the classic consumption CAPM and on the time path of transactions prices and trades, including their total and quadratic variations. We have also shown that transactions costs can explain some of the asset-pricing empirical anomalies and we have commented, in the light of our theoretical model, on the adequacy of extant empirical tests of CAPMs that include a premium for liquidity risk. Shadow prices that properly capture liquidity in the very definition of rates of return are generally not observable and the variables capturing liquidity in CAPM tests do not seem to be adequate proxies. If one wanted to test our CAPM, one would not use the standard concept of rate of return measured between fixed points in time. Instead, one would use transactions prices only, which do not occur at fixed time intervals, and one would substitute out the values of prices that are unobserved for lack of transaction. Further work is needed to develop the econometric method.

Other work should aim to model an equilibrium in which trading would not be Walrasian. In it, the rate of transactions costs would not be a given and investors would submit limit and market orders. The behavior of the limit-order book would be obtained. This would be similar to Foucault (1999) and Roșu (2009) and much of the Microstructure literature except that trades would arrive at the time of the investor’s choice, not as the result of an exogenous Poisson process. Recently, Kühl and Stroh (2010) have used the dual approach to optimize portfolio choice in a limit-order market and may have shown the way to do that.
Appendixes

A Proof of the equation system of Section 1.

The Lagrangian for problem (3) is:

\[ L_l (\{ \theta_{l,t-1,i} \}, \cdot, e_{l,t}, t) = \sup_{c_{l,t}, \{ \hat{\theta}_{l,t,i}, \tilde{\theta}_{l,t,i} \}} \inf_{\phi_{l,t}} u_l (c_{l,t}, t) \]

\[ + \sum_{j=u,d} \pi_{l,t+1,j} J_l \left( \{ \hat{\theta}_{l,t,i} + \phi_{l,t} \theta_{l,t-1,i} - \tilde{\theta}_{l,t-1,i} \}, \cdot, e_{l,t+1,j}, t + 1 \right) \]

\[ \phi_{l,t} \left[ e_{l,t} + \sum_{i=1,2} \theta_{l,t-1,i} \delta_{l,t,i} - c_{l,t} \right. \]

\[ - \sum_{i=1,2} \left( \hat{\theta}_{l,t,i} - \theta_{l,t-1,i} \right) (S_{l,i} + \lambda_{i,t}) - \sum_{i=1,2} \left( \hat{\theta}_{l,t,i} - \tilde{\theta}_{l,t-1,i} \right) (S_{l,i} + \varepsilon_{i,t}) \]

\[ + \sum_{l} \mu_{1,l,t,i} \left( \hat{\theta}_{l,t,i} - \theta_{l,t-1,i} \right) + \mu_{2,l,t,i} \left( \theta_{l,t-1,i} - \hat{\theta}_{l,t,i} \right) \]

where \( \phi_{l,t} \) is obviously the Lagrange multiplier attached to the flow budget constraint (4) and \( \mu_{1} \) and \( \mu_{2} \) are the Lagrange multipliers attached to the inequality constraints (5). The Karush-Kuhn-Tucker first-order conditions are:

\[ u_l'(c_{l,t}, t) = \phi_{l,t} \]

\[ e_{l,t} + \sum_{i=1,2} \theta_{l,t-1,i} \delta_{l,t,i} - c_{l,t} - \sum_{i=1,2} \left( \hat{\theta}_{l,t,i} - \tilde{\theta}_{l,t-1,i} \right) (S_{l,i} + \lambda_{i,t}) \]

\[ - \sum_{i=1,2} \left( \hat{\theta}_{l,t,i} - \theta_{l,t-1,i} \right) (S_{l,i} + \varepsilon_{i,t}) = 0 \]

\[ \sum_{j=u,d} \pi_{l,t+1,j} \frac{\partial J_l(t+1,j)}{\partial \theta_{l,t,i}} \left( \{ \hat{\theta}_{l,t,i} + \phi_{l,t} \theta_{l,t-1,i} - \tilde{\theta}_{l,t-1,i} \}, \cdot, e_{l,t+1,j}, t + 1 \right) \]

\[ = \phi_{l,t} \times (S_{l,i} + \lambda_{i,t}) - \mu_{1,l,t,i} \]

\[ \sum_{j=u,d} \pi_{l,t+1,j} \frac{\partial J_l(t+1,j)}{\partial \theta_{l,t,i}} \left( \{ \hat{\theta}_{l,t,i} + \phi_{l,t} \theta_{l,t-1,i} - \tilde{\theta}_{l,t-1,i} \}, \cdot, e_{l,t+1,j}, t + 1 \right) \]

\[ = \phi_{l,t} \times (S_{l,i} - \varepsilon_{i,t}) + \mu_{2,l,t,i} \]

\[ \hat{\theta}_{l,t,i} - \theta_{l,t-1,i} \leq \theta_{l,t-1,i} \leq 0; \mu_{1,l,t,i} \geq 0; \mu_{2,l,t,i} \geq 0 \]

\[ \mu_{1,l,t,i} \left( \hat{\theta}_{l,t,i} - \theta_{l,t-1,i} \right) = 0 \]

\[ \mu_{2,l,t,i} \left( \theta_{l,t-1,i} - \hat{\theta}_{l,t,i} \right) = 0 \]
where the last equations are referred to as “the complementary-slackness” conditions. Two of the first-order conditions imply that

$$
\phi_{l,t} \times (S_{t,i} + \lambda_{i,t}) - \mu_{1,l,t,i} = \phi_{l,t} \times (S_{t,i} - \varepsilon_{i,t}) + \mu_{2,l,t,i}
$$

Therefore, we can merge two Lagrange multipliers into one, $R_{l,t,i}$, defined as:

$$
\phi_{l,t} \times (R_{l,t,i} + S_{t,i}) \triangleq \phi_{l,t} \times (S_{t,i} + \lambda_{i,t}) - \mu_{1,l,t,i} = \phi_{l,t} \times (S_{t,i} - \varepsilon_{i,t}) + \mu_{2,l,t,i}
$$

and recognize one first-order condition that replaces two of them:

$$
\begin{align*}
& \sum_{j=u,d} \pi_{t,t+1,j} \frac{\partial J_{l,t+1,i}}{\partial \theta_{l,t,i}} + \phi_{l,t} \left[ \delta_{t,i} + (S_{t,i} + \lambda_{i,t}) + (S_{t,i} - \varepsilon_{i,t}) \right] - \mu_{1,l,t,i} + \mu_{2,l,t,i} \\
& = \phi_{l,t} \times (R_{l,t,i} + S_{t,i}) \quad (15)
\end{align*}
$$

In order to eliminate the value function from the first-order conditions, we differentiate the Lagrangian with respect to $\theta_{l,t-1,i}$ and then make use of (15):

$$
\begin{align*}
& \frac{\partial L_l}{\partial \theta_{l,t-1,i}} = \frac{\partial J_l}{\partial \theta_{l,t-1,i}} \\
& = - \sum_{j=u,d} \pi_{t,t+1,j} \frac{\partial J_{l,t+1,i}}{\partial \theta_{l,t,i}} + \phi_{l,t} \left[ \delta_{t,i} + (S_{t,i} + \lambda_{i,t}) + (S_{t,i} - \varepsilon_{i,t}) \right] - \mu_{1,l,t,i} + \mu_{2,l,t,i} \\
& = - \sum_{j=u,d} \pi_{t,t+1,j} \frac{\partial J_{l,t+1,i}}{\partial \theta_{l,t,i}} + \phi_{l,t} \left[ \delta_{t,i} + \theta_{l,t-1,i} - \theta_{l,t-1,i} \right] \\
& + \phi_{l,t} \delta_{t,i} + 2\phi_{l,t} \times (R_{l,t,i} + S_{t,i}) \\
& = \phi_{l,t} \left( \delta_{t,i} + R_{l,t,i} + S_{t,i} \right)
\end{align*}
$$

so that the first-order conditions can also be written:

$$
\begin{align*}
e_{l,t} + \sum_{i=1,2} \theta_{l,t-1,i} \delta_{t,i} - c_{l,t} - \sum_{i=1,2} \left( \theta_{l,t,i} + \theta_{l,t-1,i} - 2 \times \theta_{l,t-1,i} \right) (R_{l,t,i} + S_{t,i}) = 0 \\
\sum_{j=u,d} \pi_{t,t+1,j} \times \phi_{l,t+1,j} \times \left( \delta_{t+1,i,j} + R_{l,t+1,i,j} + S_{t+1,i,j} \right) = \phi_{l,t} \times (R_{l,t,i} + S_{t,i}) \\
\end{align*}
$$

$$
\begin{align*}
& \hat{\theta}_{l,t,i} \leq \theta_{l,t-1,i} \leq \overline{\theta}_{l,t,i} \\
& -\varepsilon_{i,t} \leq R_{l,t,i} \leq \lambda_{i,t} \\
& (-R_{l,t,i} + \lambda_{i,t}) \times \left( \theta_{l,t,i} - \theta_{l,t-1,i} \right) = 0 \\
& (R_{l,t,i} + \varepsilon_{i,t}) \times \left( \theta_{l,t-1,i} - \overline{\theta}_{l,t,i} \right) = 0 \\
\end{align*}
$$

(16)
As has been noted by Dumas and Lyasoff (2010) in a different context, the system made of (16) and (6) above has a drawback. It must be solved simultaneously (or globally) for all nodes of all times. As written, it cannot be solved recursively in the backward way because the unknowns at time \( t \) include consumptions at time \( t, c_{t,t} \), whereas the third subset of equations in (16) if rewritten as:

\[
\sum_{j=u,d} \pi_{t,t+1,j} \times u'_l (c_{t,t+1,j}, t) \times [\delta_{t+1,i,j} + R_{t+1,i,j} + S_{t+1,i,j}]
= \phi_{t,i} \times (R_{t+1,i} + S_{t+1,i}); l = 1, 2
\]

can be seen to be a restriction on consumptions at time \( t + 1 \), which at time \( t \) would already be solved for.

In order to “synchronize” the solution algorithm of the equations and allow recursivity, we first shift all first-order conditions except the third one forward and, second, we no longer make explicit use of the investor’s positions \( \theta_{t-1,i} \) held when entering time \( t \), focusing instead on the positions \( \theta_{t+1,i,j} \) \((\sum_{l=1,2} \theta_{t+1,i,j} = 0)\) held when exiting time \( t + 1 \). Regrouping equations in that way leads to the equation system of Section 1.

### B Time 0

After solving the equation system of Section 1, it remains to solve at time 0 the following equation system \((t = -1, t + 1 = 0)\) from which the kernel conditions only have been removed:\(^{41}\)

1. First-order conditions for time 0 consumption:

\[ u'_l (c_{t,0}, 0) = \phi_{t,0} \]

2. The set of time-0 flow budget constraints for all investors and all states of nature of that time:

\[
e_{t,0} + \sum_{i=1,2} \theta_{t-1,i} \delta_{0,i} - c_{t,0}
- \sum_{i=1,2} (\theta_{t,0,i} - \theta_{t-1,i}) (R_{t,0,i} + S_{0,i}) = 0
\]

3. Definitions:

\[
\theta_{t,0,i} = \tilde{\theta}_{t,0,i} + \hat{\theta}_{t,0,i} - \theta_{t-1,i}
\]

\(^{41}\)There could be several possible states \( j \) at time 0 but we have removed the subscript \( j \).
4. Complementary-slackness conditions:
\[
(-R_{t,0,i} + \lambda_{t,0}) \times (\theta_{t,0,i} - \theta_{t,-1,i}) = 0 \\
(R_{t,0,i} + \varepsilon_{t,0}) \times (\theta_{t,-1,i} - \hat{\theta}_{t,0,i}) = 0
\]

5. Market-clearing restrictions:
\[
\sum_{i=1,2} \theta_{t,-1,i} = 0 \text{ or } 1
\]

This system can be handled in one of two ways:

1. We can either solve for the unknowns
   \( \{c_{t,0}, R_{t,0,i}, \theta_{t,-1,i}, \hat{\theta}_{t,0,i}; l = 1, 2; j = u, d \} \) as functions of \( \{\phi_{t,0}\} \) and
   \( \{R_{t,0,i}\} \). If we plot \( \theta_{t,-1,i} \) as functions of \( \{\phi_{t,0}\} \) and \( \{R_{t,0,i}\} \), we have the
   “Negishi map”.\footnote{For a definition of the “Negishi map” in a market with frictions, see Dumas and Lysafoff (2010).} If it is invertible, we can then invert that Negishi map
   to obtain the values of \( \{\phi_{t,0}\} \) and \( \{R_{t,0,i}\} \) such that \( \theta_{t,-1,i} = \hat{\theta}_{t,i} \). If the
   values \( \theta_{t,i} \) fall outside the image set of the Negishi map, there simply does
   not exist an equilibrium as one investor would, at equilibrium prices, be
   unable to repay his/her debt to the other investor.

2. Or we drop the market-clearing equation also and solve directly this sys-
   tem for the unknowns: \( \{c_{t,0}, \phi_{t,0}, R_{t,0,i}, \hat{\theta}_{t,0,i}, \hat{\theta}_{t,0,i}; l = 1, 2; j = u, d \} \) with
   \( \theta_{t,-1,i} \) replaced in the system by the given \( \hat{\theta}_{t,i} \).

In this paper, the second method has been used.

C Scale-invariance property

Assuming that the transactions costs per share traded are proportional to the
economy’s endowment \( e_1 \), we now show that all the nodes of a given point in
time, which differ only by their value of the exogenous variable, are isomorphic
to each other, where the isomorphy simply means that we can factor out the
endowment. We call \( \lambda \triangleq \lambda/e_1 \) and \( \varepsilon \triangleq \varepsilon/e_1 \) the rescaled transactions costs and
\( \bar{R}_{t,t,i} \triangleq R_{t,t,i}/e_1 \) the rescaled shadow prices.

Given the fact that we have zero transactions costs in the last period \( T \),
using the first-order conditions for consumption, and rewriting the investors’
consumptions in terms of consumption shares $\omega_{l,T,j}$ the system of equations at time $T-1$ can be re-written as:

$$e_{l,T,j} + \sum_{i=1,2} l_{i,T-1} \delta_{T,i,j} - \omega_{l,T,j} \times e_{l,T,j} = 0$$

$$-\tilde{R}_{1,T-1,i} \times e_{1,T-1} + \beta_1 \sum_{j=1,2} \pi_{T-1,T,j} \times \left( \frac{\omega_{1,T,j}}{\omega_{1,T-1}} \times \frac{e_{1,T,j}}{e_{1,T-1}} \right) ^{-\gamma_1} \times \delta_{T,i,j}$$

$$\quad = \quad -\tilde{R}_{2,T-1,i} \times e_{1,T-1} + \beta_2 \sum_{j=1,2} \pi_{T-1,T,j} \times \left( \frac{\omega_{2,T,j}}{\omega_{2,T-1}} \times \frac{e_{1,T,j}}{e_{1,T-1}} \right) ^{-\gamma_2} \times \delta_{T,i,j}$$

$$\quad + \sum_{l=1,2} \theta_{l,T-1,i} = 0$$

with unknowns $\{\omega_{l,T,j}; l = 1, 2; j = 1, 2\}$, $\{\theta_{l,T-1,i}; l = 1, 2; i = 1, 2\}$.

Using the fact that the risky asset pays as dividends the endowment of Investor 1, i.e. $\delta_{T,2,j} = e_{1,T,j}$, and that the riskless asset has a unit payoff, we can solve the flow budget equation for $j = 1$ for the holdings in the first asset:

$$\theta_{l,T-1,1} = e_{1,T-1} \times u \times (\omega_{l,T-1} - 1_{l,E} - \theta_{l,T-1,2})$$, \hspace{1cm} (17)

where $u$ is the size of the multiplicative up move in the tree ($d$ is the down move) and $1_{l,E}$ denotes an indicator for receiving endowment, i.e. $1_{1,E} = 1$ and $1_{2,E} = 0$. Plugging this expression into the flow budget equation for $j = 2$, we can solve for $\theta_{l,T-1,2}$:

$$\theta_{l,T-1,2} = \frac{1_{l,E} \times (d - u) - \omega_{l,T,1} \times d + \omega_{l,T,2} \times u}{u - d}$$, \hspace{1cm} (18)

Rewriting the kernel conditions and reducing the system using (17) and (18), we get a system with unknowns $\{\omega_{l,T,j}; l = 1, 2; j = 1, 2\}$ only:

$$\beta_1 \sum_{j=u,d} \pi_{T-1,T,j} \left( \frac{\omega_{1,T,j}}{\omega_{1,T-1}} \right) ^{-\gamma_1} r_j ^{-\gamma_1} = \beta_2 \sum_{j=u,d} \pi_{T-1,T,j} \left( \frac{\omega_{2,T,j}}{\omega_{2,T-1}} \right) ^{-\gamma_2} r_j ^{-\gamma_2}$$

$$-\tilde{R}_{1,T-1,i} \times e_{1,T-1} + \beta_1 \sum_{j=u,d} \pi_{T-1,T,j} \left( \frac{\omega_{1,T,j}}{\omega_{1,T-1}} \right) ^{-\gamma_1} r_j ^{-\gamma_1 + 1}$$

$$\quad = \quad -\tilde{R}_{2,T-1,i} \times e_{1,T-1} + \beta_2 \sum_{j=u,d} \pi_{T-1,T,j} \left( \frac{\omega_{2,T,j}}{\omega_{2,T-1}} \right) ^{-\gamma_2} r_j ^{-\gamma_2 + 1}$$

$$\omega_{1,T,2} \times u - \omega_{1,T,1} \times d \quad \frac{u - d}{u - d} + \omega_{2,T,2} \times u - \omega_{2,T,1} \times d \quad \frac{u - d}{u - d} = 0$$

$$\left( \frac{\omega_{1,T,1} - \omega_{1,T,2} \times u - \omega_{1,T,1} \times d}{u - d} \right) + \left( \frac{\omega_{2,T,1} - \omega_{2,T,2} \times u - \omega_{2,T,1} \times d}{u - d} \right) = 0$$

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where \( r_j = u \) for \( j = 1 \) and \( r_j = d \) for \( j = 2 \).

Importantly, this system of equations does not depend on the current or future levels of endowment, i.e., it is enough to solve the system for one node at time \( T - 1 \) as long as \( u \) and \( d \) are not state (node) dependent.

After solving this system, one can compute the implied holdings and asset prices. From (18) we get that the stock holdings are independent of \( T - 1 \) endowment, while from (17) we know that the bond holdings are scaled by the \( T - 1 \) endowment:

\[
\theta_{t,T-1} = e_{1,T-1} \times u \times \left( \omega_{t,T,1} - 1, E - \frac{1, E (d - u) - \omega_{t,T,1} d + \omega_{t,T,2} u}{u - d} \right)
\]

\[
= e_{1,T-1} \times \tilde{\theta}_{t,T-1,1},
\]

where \( \tilde{\theta}_{t,T-1,1} \) denotes the normalized bond holdings for \( e_{1,T-1} = 1 \). Moreover, we get that the bond price does not depend on \( T - 1 \) endowment:

\[
S_{T-1,1} = \beta_1 \sum_{j=u,d} \pi_{T-1,T,j} \times \left( \frac{\omega_{1,T,j}}{\omega_{1,T-1}} \right)^{-\gamma_1} \times r_j^{-\gamma_1},
\]

and that the stock price is scaled by the \( T - 1 \) endowment:

\[
S_{T-1,2} = e_{1,T-1} \times \left[ -\tilde{R}_{1,T-1,i} + \beta_1 \sum_{j=u,d} \pi_{T-1,T,j} \times \left( \frac{\omega_{1,T,j}}{\omega_{1,T-1}} \right)^{-\gamma_1} \times r_j^{-\gamma_1} \right]
\]

\[
\triangleq e_{1,T-1} \times \tilde{S}_{T-1,2},
\]

where \( \tilde{S}_{T-1,2} \) denotes the normalized price for \( e_{1,T-1} = 1 \).

\[ \text{Time } t < T-1 \]

For time \( t < T - 1 \) the system of equations is the system of Section 1. Rewriting \( \theta_{t+1,1} = \omega_{t+1,1} \times e_{t+1,1} \), replacing \( S_{t+1,2} \) and \( \tilde{\theta}_{t+1,1} \) with expressions (20) and (19), and solving the flow budget equation for \( j = 1 \) for \( \theta_{t+1},1 \), we get:

\[
\theta_{t+1,1} = e_{1,t} \times u \times \left[ \omega_{t+1,1} + \frac{\theta_{t+1,1,2} - \theta_{t+1,2}}{\theta_{t+1,1} S_{t+1,1,1} - 1, E - \theta_{t+1,2}} \right]
\]

Plugging this into the budget equation for \( j = 2 \), and solving for \( \theta_{t+2} \), we get:

\[
\theta_{t+2} = \frac{1}{(d \times (\tilde{R}_{t+1,2,2} + \tilde{S}_{T-1,2,2}) - u \times (\tilde{R}_{t+1,2,1} + \tilde{S}_{T-1,2,1})) \times}
\]

\[
[d \times (\omega_{t+1,2} - 1, E + \theta_{t+1,1,1} S_{t+1,1,1} + \theta_{t+1,2,2} (\tilde{R}_{t+1,2,2} + \tilde{S}_{t+1,2,2}) - u \times (\omega_{t+1,1} + \theta_{t+1,1,1} S_{t+1,1,1} + \theta_{t+1,2,2} (\tilde{R}_{t+1,2,2} + \tilde{S}_{t+1,2,2})]}
\]

Rewriting the kernel conditions, we can write the system as:

\[
\beta_1 \sum_{j=u,d} \pi_{T-1,T,j} \left( \frac{\omega_{1,T,j}}{\omega_{1,T-1}} \right)^{-\gamma_1} r_j^{-\gamma_1} = \beta_2 \sum_{j=u,d} \pi_{T-1,T,j} \left( \frac{\omega_{2,T,j}}{\omega_{2,T-1}} \right)^{-\gamma_2} r_j^{-\gamma_2}
\]

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\[-R_{1,t,i} + \beta_1 \sum_{j=u,d} \pi_{t,t+1,j} \left( \frac{\omega_{1,t+1,j}}{\omega_{1,t}} \right)^{-\gamma_1} \sigma_j^{\gamma_1-1} \left( 1 + \bar{R}_{1,t+1,i,j} + \bar{S}_{t+1,2,j} \right) \]
\[-R_{2,t,i} + \beta_2 \sum_{j=u,d} \pi_{t,t+1,j} \left( \frac{\omega_{2,t+1,j}}{\omega_{2,t}} \right)^{-\gamma_2} \sigma_j^{\gamma_2-1} \left( 1 + \bar{R}_{2,t+1,i,j} + \bar{S}_{t+1,2,j} \right) \]
\[
\theta_{t,t+1,i,j} = \tilde{\theta}_{t,t+1,i,j} + \tilde{\theta}_{t,t+1,i,j} - \theta_{t,t,i} \]
\[
(-\bar{R}_{t,t+1,i,j} + \bar{\lambda}_{t+1,i,j}) \times (\tilde{\theta}_{t,t+1,i,j} - \theta_{t,t,i}) = 0 \]
\[
(\bar{R}_{t,t+1,i,j} + \bar{\varepsilon}_{t+1,i,j}) \times (\theta_{t,t,i} - \tilde{\theta}_{t,t+1,i,j}) = 0 \]
\[
\sum_{l=1,2} \theta_{t,t,i} = 0 \]

with unknowns \( \{ \omega_{t+1,j,i}; \bar{R}_{t+1,j,i}; \tilde{\theta}_{t+1,i,j}; \hat{\theta}_{t+1,i,j}; l = 1, 2; j = 1, 2 \} \). The holdings implied are given by (21) and an analogous equation for the bond. Note, one can show that the endowment \( e_{1,t} \) cancels out in the market clearing conditions. This system does not depend on the level of endowment \( e_{1,t} \), only on \( u \) as well as \( d \), and therefore we only need to solve the system at one node at time \( t \).

As backward interpolated values we use the bond price \( S_{t+1,2,j} \) and stock holdings \( \theta_{t+1,2,j} \) as well as the normalized stock price \( \bar{S}_{t+1,2,j} \) and normalized bond holdings \( \bar{\theta}_{t+1,1,j} \). After solving the system we can compute the implied time \( t \) holdings and prices. Again, holdings in the bond and the stock price are scaled by \( e_{1,t} \), while the holdings in the stock and the bond price are not scaled. Using backward induction the scaling invariance holds for any time \( t \).

\section*{D \ Proof of Proposition 4}

\textbf{Time} \( T - 1 \)

The stock price in an economy without transactions costs is given by:

\[
S_{T-1}^* = \mathbb{E}_{T-1} \left[ \frac{\phi_{i,T}}{\phi_{i,T-1}} \delta_T \right] \]

whereas Equation (8) applied to time \( T - 1 \) is:

\[
S_{T-1} = -R_{i,T-1} + \mathbb{E}_{T-1} \left[ \frac{\phi_{i,T}}{\phi_{i,T-1}} \delta_T \right] \]

which can be rewritten as:

\[
S_{T-1} = -R_{i,T-1} + \mathbb{E}_{T-1} \left[ \frac{\phi_{i,T}}{\phi_{i,T-1}} \delta_T \right] + \mathbb{E}_{T-1} \left[ \left( \frac{\phi_{i,t,T}}{\phi_{i,t-1}} - \frac{\phi_{i,t-1}}{\phi_{i,t-1}} \right) \delta_T \right] \]
\[
S_{T-1} = -R_{i,T-1} + \mathbb{E}_{T-1} \left[ \frac{\phi_{i,T}}{\phi_{i,T-1}} \delta_T \right] + \mathbb{E}_{T-1} \left[ \Delta \phi_{i,T} \delta_T \right] \]
where we defined:

$$\Delta \phi_{1, T} \triangleq \frac{\phi_{1, T}}{\phi_{1, T-1}} - \frac{\phi_{1, T}^*}{\phi_{1, T-1}^*}$$

The difference between the stock price in a zero-transactions costs economy and an economy with transactions costs is given by:

$$S_{T-1} - S_{T-1}^* = -R_{l, T-1} - E_{T-1} \left[ \Delta \phi_{1, T} \delta T \right] \quad (22)$$

**Time T - 2**

The stock price in an economy without transactions costs is given by:

$$S_{T-2}^* = E_{T-2} \left[ \frac{\phi_{1, T-1}}{\phi_{1, T-2}} \left( \delta_{T-1} + S_{T-1}^* \right) \right]$$

whereas Equation (8) applied to time $T - 2$ is:

$$S_{T-2} = -R_{l, T-2} + E_{T-2} \left[ \frac{\phi_{1, T-1}}{\phi_{1, T-2}} \left( \delta_{T-1} + S_{T-1} + R_{l, T-1} \right) \right]$$

Replacing $S_{T-1} + R_{l, T-1}$ with expression (22), this can be rewritten as:

$$S_{T-2} = -R_{l, T-2} + E_{T-2} \left[ \frac{\phi_{1, T-1}}{\phi_{1, T-2}} \left( \delta_{T-1} + S_{T-1}^* \right) + E_{T-2} \left[ \Delta \phi_{1, T} \delta T \right] \right]$$

$$= -R_{l, T-2} + S_{T-2}^* + E_{T-2} \left[ \Delta \phi_{1, T-1} \left( \delta_{T-1} + S_{T-1}^* \right) \right] + E_{T-2} \left[ \frac{\phi_{1, T-1}}{\phi_{1, T-2}} \Delta \phi_{1, T} \delta T \right]$$

The difference between the stock price in a zero-transactions costs economy and an economy with transactions costs is given by:

$$S_{T-2} - S_{T-2}^* = -R_{l, T-2} + E_{T-2} \left[ \Delta \phi_{1, T-1} \left( \delta_{T-1} + S_{T-1}^* \right) \right] + E_{T-2} \left[ \frac{\phi_{1, T-1}}{\phi_{1, T-2}} \Delta \phi_{1, T} \delta T \right]$$

**Time t**

By an induction argument one can show the final result (4).
References


